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Abstract 
 
   The goal of this paper was to determine if the Soviet Union’s reaction to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis would be similar to the People’s Republic of China’s reaction to a 
crisis situation involving strategic nuclear assets.  This was done taking into account the 
differences in Eastern and Western cultures, each government’s decision making 
structures, and the differences between the past and present situations.  The result is a set 
of recommendations to the Naval War College on the effectiveness of this method.      
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Executive Summary 
 
 Understanding how decisions are made in the highest echelons of governments 
with nuclear capabilities is of great strategic importance for the United States.  Knowing, 
or being able to predict how your opponent will react to a sequence of events is a prized 
asset.  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of these nuclear capable nations, 
whom the United States would strategically have to consider as a potential opponent in 
modeling global threats, yet they are highly secretive about the inner workings of their 
higher levels of government, therefore an easy analysis on their decision making process 
is not possible.  Only limited data exists about their internal decision making process 
during critical or crisis situations, and it is unknown how they might react to a crisis 
involving strategic nuclear assets.  In an effort to overcome this lack of data, one could 
perform a comparative analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the United States and 
the Soviet Union contemplated the use of nuclear weapons against one another.  The 
Soviet Union and the PRC have similar authoritarian style governments, so that an 
analysis of the incident could be extrapolated to the current situation.  The limited 
material available on the PRC could then be compared to the result of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis research, to determine how accurate the extrapolation might be.   
 This paper attempts to overcome the lack of information by using the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, for which there is a wealth of information and analysis available, as a 
proxy for a crisis involving the PRC.  Using this analysis and a study of the PRC’s more 
recent history, we may be able to better “predict” how the PRC will respond in crisis 
now, and into the future.  
 This goal was accomplished through three strategies:   
1. Historical research of the CMC was compared to the PRC of today to check for 
similarities and differences to determine how accurate a comparison could be 
made.   
2. Research of PRC decision making over the last 10-15 years.   
3. The synthesis of the historical investigations and the development of 
recommendations  
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1. Introduction 
 The creation of weapons than can obliterate entire cities, fleets, or armies in mere 
moments require that the nations who posses them to pause and consider their actions 
before deploying them.  The United States has been the leader of the Western World in 
nuclear deterrence since the inception of the atomic age.  Its ability to maintain a balance 
between the growing numbers of nuclear capable nations comes from its ability to field 
superior technology and its extensive intelligence networks.  One of the strengths of the 
United States is its ability to predict the actions of its competitors based on knowledge 
gathered from past incidents of high tension or conflict.  This strength has been 
continually tested since the end of the Cold War.  
 The United States Naval War College (NWC) has been a leader in developing 
national strategy for over a century.  A large part of the NWC is devoted to attempting to 
predict, or at least better understand, an enemy’s actions.  A graduate school for officers 
of all branches of the military and those in the national security community, the NWC is 
renowned for their war games, in which the faculty and students attempt to create 
possible scenarios that have the potential for escalating conflict.  This is done to better 
understand the strategic and operational ramifications of the varying thought processes of 
opponents and how they might react to United State’s actions.  
 Understanding how decisions are made in the highest echelons of governments 
with nuclear capabilities is of great strategic importance for the United States.  Knowing 
how an opponent will react to a sequence of events is a prized asset.  The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is one of these nuclear capable nations and is highly secretive 
about its higher levels of government.  Only limited data exists about their internal 
decision making process during critical situations.  In order to overcome this lack of data, 
one could perform a comparative analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the United 
States and the Soviet Union contemplated the use of nuclear weapons.  The Soviet Union 
and the PRC have similar authoritarian style governments, so that it may be valid to 
extrapolate an analysis of the 1962 incident to the current situation.  The limited material 
available on the PRC could then be compared to the result of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
research to determine how valid the extrapolation might be.   
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 The result of the extrapolation would then be compared with the United States’ 
style of decision making.  The contrast between the two styles could highlight possible 
key friction points in how the United States and the PRC come to a decision.  Both the 
United States and PRC decision making processes would then be compared to existing 
decision making models.  If a model is noticeably similar with the research findings, then 
future predictions of their behavior could become more accurate.  The PRC has changed 
a great deal over the past 20 years.  Using its recent history in addition to the earlier 
Cuban Missile Crisis comparison, we may be able to better predict how the PRC will 
continue to change over the next 10 years. 
 
 2
2. Problem Statement 
 The highest echelons of government within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
are highly secretive, and it is unknown how they might react within a crisis involving 
strategic nuclear assets.  This paper attempts to overcome the lack of information by 
using the Cuban Missile Crisis, for which there is a wealth of information and analysis 
available, as a proxy for a crisis involving the PRC.  Using this analysis and a study of 
the PRC’s more recent history, it may be possible to gain insights into the future of their 
strategic decision making processes.  
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3. Methodology 
 The Naval War College (NWC) needs to be able to better predict the actions of 
the People’s Republic of China in a situation that presents the risk of escalating conflict.  
The goal of the project was to advise the NWC on a possible decision making processes 
that the PRC would use based on a past incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis.     
 This goal was accomplished through three strategies:   
 
1. Historical research of the CMC was compared to the PRC of today to check 
for similarities and differences to determine how accurate a comparison could 
be made.   
2. Research of PRC decision making over the last 10-15 years.   
3. The synthesis of the historical investigations and the development of 
recommendations  
 
 In order to accomplish these objectives, multiple data gathering strategies were 
implemented.  I researched various aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis and identified key 
decisions on both sides.  An analysis of the Open Source Center was used to develop 
what the PRC might do today and in the near future.   
3.1 Historical Research 
 The first part of the research was the historical research into the CMC and 
strategic theory.  This required the use of multiple sources of information, including 
numerous books and academic journals.  Books provided a great depth of information 
over a number of events and background information.  Journals were also used to provide 
expert analysis of specific events and minute details.   
3.2 Databases 
 Databases such as the Open Source Center were used and analyzed to look for 
trends in the PRC’s recent past that may allude to their decision making process.  These 
trends can be seen in how the PRC’s leadership interacts with other countries and how it 
deals with internal issues.  The investigation of these current trends served two purposes.  
The first was to confirm the validity of making a CMC to modern China comparison.  
The second was to base predictions of China’s near future on them.    
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3.3 Analysis 
 The information generated by the research gave a great deal of insight into the 
possible structure of PRC decision making.  Through the process of analyzing the data 
given from these various sources, comparisons could be made between theory and action, 
and between past and present.  After a thorough review, it was possible to develop 
recommendations to be used by the NWC staff to better understand and investigate the 
PRC. 
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4. Literature Review 
4.1 The Cuban Missile Crisis 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 was the closest the United States came 
to a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.  The Soviet leadership’s decision to place 
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 
(IRBM) in Cuba came as shock to the Kennedy Administration.  On Tuesday, October 
16th photo reconnaissance from U-2 spy plane over flights of Cuba were delivered to 
President Kennedy, and the crisis began. 
 The opinions Khrushchev and Kennedy had of each other were not very positive.  
The two leaders met face to face once prior to the crisis, at a summit meeting in Vienna 
in June 1961.  Khrushchev, in Kennedy’s view, was a bully who lectured him on the 
superiority of communism and American misdeeds.  Khrushchev thought Kennedy was 
weak and could be pushed into accepting Soviet actions with little resistance.   
Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev had repeatedly reassured President Kennedy 
in the months preceding the crisis that he would do nothing that would provoke the 
Americans in the lead up to the November elections.  Kennedy and Khrushchev had built 
up a level of trust between each other, with their personal relations having improved 
since the Bay of Pigs incident.  Based on previous Soviet behavior, the Kennedy 
Administration had little reason to believe that missiles would be positioned in Cuba.  
The Soviets had never positioned strategic nuclear weapons outside the Soviet Union, not 
even in the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe.  Cuba was far from the Soviet sphere 
of influence in Eurasia.  It would be difficult to communicate with and supply in a time of 
war, and was of questionable stability having gone through its own communist revolution 
just three years earlier.  The Berlin Crises had also been a victory for the West with 
Khrushchev threatening and backing down each time.  Kennedy had also made public 
statements that the United States would not stand for offensive weapons being based in 
Cuba1.  
 Khrushchev and his ministers had a number of motivations for choosing to place 
the missiles in Cuba.  These motivations include the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the 
summer 1961 speech by Senator J. William Fulbright which said that Soviet missiles or 
bombers in Cuba would not alter the balance of power greatly, the Kennedy 
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Administration’s discovery in the fall of 1961 that the missile gap was overwhelmingly in 
America’s favor and subsequent public announcement of it, that the Soviets had been 
providing Cuba with military supplies since 1960 without consequence, and finally the 
Kennedy Administration’s statements on the Soviet arms being sent to Cuba were quite 
restrained2. 
 The placement of missiles in Cuba was a solution to a number of problems facing 
the Soviet leadership.  The first was the Cuban problem.  They had been requesting 
Soviet guarantees of their security which the Soviets were reluctant to give.  The second 
problem was the strategic one.  The missile gap was very much in America’s favor and 
the existing Soviet ICBMs were unreliable and inaccurate.  It’s possible that the Strategic 
Rocket Forces suggested the need for immediate measures to close the gap by stationing 
their more numerous and higher quality IRBMs and MRBMs in Cuba.  Third was the 
Berlin problem3.  Khrushchev had tied his personal prestige to finding a solution to the 
Berlin issue on Soviet terms.  His two earlier bluffs on Berlin had failed which had 
reduced his and his supporters’ standings.  He could finally resolve the issue if he could 
apply pressure on the Americans using a new tact.  Another problem facing them was the 
economy.  The Soviet economy had been growing at a slower than calculated rate but 
demands from the Strategic Rocket Forces, the army and their satellite states had been 
increasing.  The decision to place missiles in Cuba would cost much less than to start 
production of the ICBMs the Strategic Rocket Forces were clamoring for.  The last 
problem facing the decision makers were domestic issues.  Various conflicts such as 
Stalinists vs. anti-Stalinists, whether or not the economy should take predominance over 
politics all had their influences.  Khrushchev’s support of the idea to place strategic 
weapons in Cuba was influenced by the revolutionary spirit he felt that he shared with 
Castro.  Both men were fervent communists whose bombastic personalities meshed well 
together.   
 On the morning of October 16th, the President brought together a small group of 
his most trusted advisors to discuss the situation.  He chose not to convene the more 
formal National Security Council because that would involve bringing in the entire 
cabinet, a large number of whom had no experience with military or foreign affairs, such 
as the Secretary of the Interior or Education.  Keeping it to a smaller group would better 
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prevent leaks and surround the president with advisors that had the most relevant 
experience.  This group would officially become known as the Executive Committee of 
the National Security Council, or Ex Comm.  Its membership is outlined in the table 
below.  While not members of the Ex Comm, a number of technical experts from the CIA 
and Pentagon would be brought in at times to share their expertise. 
Position Name 
President John F. Kennedy 
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson 
Secretary of State David Rusk 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 
General Maxwell Taylor, 
USA 
Special Assistant to the 
President for National 
Security Affairs 
McGeorge Bundy  
Deputy Secretary of 
Defense 
Roswell Gilpatric 
Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin 
Diplomat, Soviet Expert Charles Bohlen 
Undersecretary of State George Ball 
The President’s Special 
Council 
Ted Sorenson 
US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson 
Former US Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union 
Llewellyn Thompson 
Director of the CIA John McCone 
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon 
  
 This group of individuals varied greatly in their opinions on how to handle crisis.  
It was from this crisis that the terms Hawks and Doves originated.  The most Hawkish of 
the Hawks was Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtiss LeMay.  He strongly advocated 
a first strike against the Cuban missile sites and that anything short that would be seen as 
a sign of weakness by the Soviets.  The members of the Ex Comm shifted between the 
two groups, from those favoring direct action against the missile sites and those hoping 
for a more diplomatic solution.  On the morning of Saturday October 20th, they were in 
agreement on a blockade as a middle ground compromise between the two groups.  An 
airstrike on Cuba would certainly involve a Soviet reprisal, which could involve the 
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launching of the missiles from Cuba, the Soviets seizing Berlin, or all out nuclear war.  A 
diplomatic solution would involve sending an ultimatum to Khrushchev or presenting 
him with an offer to remove the missiles in exchange for the removal of US missiles from 
Turkey and Italy.  These ideas were dismissed on the grounds that they would make the 
Administration seem weak; providing the Soviets with the option to stall their response 
until all the missile sites were complete, and, in either case, give control of the situation 
to the Soviets.  A blockade would normally be considered an act of war, unless the 
Kennedy Administration had approval from the Organization of American States (OAS) 
that this was an action to preserve the security of the entire hemisphere.  The blockade 
would only screen for weapons, it would allow fuel and food and other supplies to 
proceed.  The blockade would prevent the delivery of any more warheads and missiles to 
Cuba and would keep the option of an airstrike open3.   
   Both the President and the Premier bypassed formal structures for ad hoc groups.  
The full Presidium was not summoned to Moscow for the duration of the crisis.  
Khrushchev was a lone actor in deciding to place the missiles in Cuba as much as 
Kennedy was one during the crisis.  The players assisting Khrushchev can be divided into 
two groups, the military and intelligence group, and the international communist 
movement group.  In the first group there was Khrushchev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Kosygin, 
Brezhnev, Gromyko, Malinovsky, Semichastny, and Ustinov.  The second group 
consisted of Khrushchev, Kuusinem, Suslov, Ponomarev, and Andropov.  On October 22, 
almost the midpoint of the crisis Khrushchev outlined what he believed the options were 
under the belief that an American attack was inevitable.  The first was to announce a 
security treaty over the radio that placed Cuba under the same nuclear protection as the 
Soviet Union, the second was to transfer control of all weapons to the Cubans in case of 
attack, or the third option of permitting Soviet troops in Cuba to defend themselves with 
short range nuclear armed cruise missiles capable of destroying an invasion force but not 
the missiles capable of reaching the United States.    
 At the time, most American officials thought there were five possibilities that 
could’ve brought us to nuclear war.  The first was if the United States attacks the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba.  The second was if the Soviet Union attacks US missiles in Turkey and 
Italy.  The third way was a reprisal attack by NATO on the bases from which the attacks 
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on Turkey and Italy were launched.  The fourth way would be if the Soviets, fearing an 
American attack, launch their ICBMs and bombers preemptively against the United 
States.  The last way was if the United States decimates the Soviet Union preemptively2.    
 The National Security Council had its first meeting of the crisis on Sunday, 
October 21st to formally ratify the decisions made in the Ex Comm.  On the 22nd the NSC 
formally authorized the creation of the Ex Comm.  The morning of the 22nd the United 
States notified its allies of its intent to implement a blockade and that evening Kennedy 
announced the crisis in an announcement to the world.  One hour before the speech was 
given; a copy of it was delivered to the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Dobrynin.  
The blockade line would be set 500 miles off of Cuba’s eastern most point.  This would 
allow US decision makers time to decide whether or not a vessel should be boarded and 
keep US vessels out of range of land based MIGs.  It would officially come into effect on 
the morning of the 24th.  The Soviet leadership responded by sending orders to sixteen of 
the supply ships headed towards Cuba to return to the Soviet Union.  The issue was what 
to do with the four Foxtrot class submarines that had been sent to Cuba to set up a 
submarine base and were now a few days sailing from Cuban waters.  If detected by the 
blockade they would likely increase the chance of conflict and each submarine carried 
one nuclear torpedo in addition to its conventional ones.  The decision was made to keep 
the subs two to three days sailing from Cuban waters, outside of the blockade.  
Unbeknownst to them was that the US Navy was already in pursuit of them.  
 Questions concerning the blockade were of great importance to secretary of 
defense McNamara and the President the day before it went into effect.  McNamara 
believed the information he was getting from the Navy wasn’t as timely or as accurate as 
it could’ve been.  Circumventing the chain of command he went straight to Navy Plot in 
the Pentagon where the positions of the blockade and Soviet ships were being monitored.  
McNamara questioned the admiral on duty for the plot; how will they signal a Soviet ship 
to stop, are there interpreters ready, what is the response if they open fire?  Not liking the 
answers he was getting he went to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George Anderson.  
The admiral felt that McNamara was meddling in Navy affairs and resented him for it.  
The discussion between them nearly reached a shouting match and resulted in McNamara 
losing confidence in Anderson.      
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 On the 24th Khrushchev met with William Knox, the president of Westinghouse 
International who was in Moscow on unrelated business.  Knox was summoned by 
Khrushchev under the belief that as a high level businessman he was part of the secret 
capitalist group that actually ran America.  Khrushchev, who appeared exhausted, told 
Knox that Soviet submarines would sink any American vessel that committed an act of 
piracy.  He went on to say that he couldn’t understand Kennedy due to the large age gap 
between them, Khrushchev was sixty-eight Kennedy was forty-five, saying that Kennedy 
is no older than his own son.  That afternoon, in the Atlantic, half of the Soviet chartered 
ships bound for Cuba stopped or changed course.     
 Air Force General Thomas Power commander of the US Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) brought the force to DEFCON 2 while the rest of the American forces remained at 
DEFCON 3, on the 24th at the same time the naval blockade came into effect.  SAC 
would reach its maximum strength a week later on November 4th.  At that time a force of 
2,962 nuclear weapons would be in the air or on 15 minute alert.  This force would 
consist of 1,479 bombers, 1,003 refueling tankers, and 182 ballistic missiles4.  Power 
announced to his commanders that they were in heightened state of readiness over high 
frequency radio for the benefit of Soviet monitors who intercepted the message. 
 By the 25th Khrushchev was beginning to realize that he had miscalculated what 
the American response would be to the missiles.  His assumption was that Kennedy 
would accept the missiles in Cuba as he had accepted American missiles in Turkey and 
Italy.  He was definitely worried about SAC moving to DEFCON 2 and the President’s 
continued demand that the missiles be removed from Cuba.  He had no desire to start a 
war with America, let alone a nuclear one.  If Khrushchev could get Kennedy to promise 
that America would not invade Cuba then he believed a deal would be possible.  One of 
the greatest impediments to a peaceful resolution was the Soviet and American Cold War 
policy of not conceding anything.     
 The first ship intercepted by the blockade was the Marcula on the morning of the 
26th; a Soviet chartered ship, Panamanian owned with a Lebanese registry.  The ship did 
not carry any weapons, only industrial cargo such as paper and truck parts.  The Navy 
would demonstrate its resolve in upholding the blockade by boarding it.  The captain was 
highly cooperative to the American boarding party which arrived unarmed and in service 
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whites.  In Washington, John Scali, a diplomatic correspondent in the American 
Broadcasting Company, was contacted by Alexander Fomin, a Soviet Embassy 
Counselor and suspected KGB colonel.  He gave Scali a proposal for the consideration of 
his contacts in the State Department1: 
1. The missile sites would be dismantled and shipped back to the Soviet Union 
under UN supervision 
2. Castro would pledge himself to accept no offensive weapons in the future 
3. The United States would pledge itself not to invade Cuba 
That evening of the 26th, while the Ex Comm was discussing the proposal they received a 
letter from Khrushchev.  It was a long emotional letter and at times it seemed to ramble 
on and off the topic.  It was clearly written by Khrushchev himself as it lacked the official 
editing characteristic of the Soviets.  It did say that if Kennedy promised not to invade 
Cuba or support any force with the intention to do so then there would be no need for the 
Soviet specialists to remain in Cuba.   
 The morning of the 27th changed everything with a letter read over Radio Moscow 
by Khrushchev that changed the agreement as provided by Fomin.  In addition to the 
United States promising not to invade Cuba, the Soviets added the demand that the 
United States would also have to remove their missiles from Turkey.  Adding to the 
tension of the negotiations was the news of a U-2 being shot down over Cuba, killing the 
pilot.  The Ex Comm was unsure what to make of this new demand from Khrushchev.  
The Jupiter missiles in Turkey were obsolete, but removing them under Soviet pressure 
could cripple NATO because it could be seen as the United States trading domestic 
security for Turkey’s missile defense.  The other option would be war.  Tensions 
mounted further when a U-2 on an air sampling flight over the North Pole drifted into 
Soviet airspace.   
 Multiple channels of communication were used between Moscow and 
Washington.  1. public letters between the two heads of government 2. private letters 
between the two heads of government 3. public and private statements by US officials in 
Washington; the Party, government, and military press in Moscow 4. news conferences 5. 
messages through intelligence channels 6. public and private letters through third parties 
7. leaks 8. private communication from JFK to RFK to Dobrynin to Khrushchev2.   
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 The response Kennedy sent was to the first letter, an ultimatum saying 
negotiations would not continue until the building of missile sites in Cuba ceased and the 
United States would resort to force if the Soviets did not comply.  Khrushchev replied 
over Radio Moscow on the 28th; saying that the Soviet Union would dismantle the 
missiles under UN supervision.  Kennedy accepted over the Voice of America and 
offered future negotiations involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  In addition to the 
radio message, Kennedy sent a private letter saying he was willing to discuss the 
disarmament of critical areas; an allusion to Turkey and Italy. 
4.2 Strategic Theory 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in the beginning of the 1960s.  There have 
been numerous changes in how strategic nuclear weapons are viewed and their possible 
uses.  The backbone of American strategic policy is based on a strategy of preventing 
nuclear war by deterring it.  This strategy has been termed as Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD).  The primary tenet of MAD is the threat of retaliation with nuclear 
weapons if the United States or its interests are attacked with nuclear weapons first.  
However, the United States may commit to the use of nuclear weapons first if enemy 
conventional forces seem to threaten our or our allies’ interests and cannot be contained 
by conventional means.  The use of nuclear weapons can be speculated to fall within 
three types of retaliation; all-out, controlled, or flexible response.  However, the United 
States has historically used major attack options (MAOs), limited nuclear options 
(LNOs), regional nuclear options (RNOs), and theater nuclear options (TNOs). 
 All-out retaliation is the worst case scenario where enemy forces strike first, 
targeting American cities and military installations simultaneously.  This act would 
generate a comprehensive retaliatory response from the United States, with the goal being 
the complete destruction of the enemy.   
 Controlled retaliation is a variable response that the National Command Authority 
(NCA) can decide upon in proportion with the attack suffered.  If, for example, an enemy 
nuclear strike targeted only US Pacific naval bases, then the United States would likely 
respond in kind by targeting the enemy’s naval bases.  Having the option of a controlled 
response increases the level of deterrence provided by the nuclear weapons by increasing 
the potential of their use without total devastation, describes a nation’s credibility of use.  
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Another advantage is that, after a controlled exchange, it is possible for a balance to 
occur and for deterrence to reassert itself.  Each side will have experienced some level of 
attack and may be less likely to risk being bloodied any further.  The key to this strategy 
being a viable option is ensuring the attack is both effective and recognizably limited.  
This requires that some level of the enemy’s command and control systems survive the 
attack in order to monitor the attack and report the results.  Certain constraints must be 
placed on the manner in which the strike is executed, to ensure that it is recognized by 
enemy warning systems as being limited.  The targets should be limited to certain areas 
and away from major population centers.  The time that the attack takes place in should 
be limited as well, giving it a discernable end that will allow the enemy to assess the 
damage.   
 Flexible response is the policy of threatening to use nuclear weapons, starting at 
the theater level, should conventional means of deterrence fail to prevent an enemy 
attack.  This type of response would normally be targeting enemy conventional forces or 
their theater nuclear forces.    
 In addition to the theories and strategies of escalating a nuclear war are the 
theories for ending them short of total annihilation.  The motivation behind war 
termination is that each is state is concerned for its welfare and has an instinct for 
survival that would continue after a limited exchange.  This is the essentially the same 
principle behind deterrence.  Its failing is its assumptions that nations have innately 
similar values that will be adhered to during a potentially devastating conflict.  In ending 
a conflict, communication must be possible between the combatants, which would be 
highly difficult but necessary.  There would need to be a trust that whatever leadership 
survived the attack would be able to speak for the whole of their forces, and then be able 
to distribute to those forces the results of the negotiations.  Ending a nuclear conflict 
would be no easier than ending a conventional conflict since each state would have a 
number of internal political issues to resolve before hostilities could end.       
 The planning process of selecting targets is a straightforward but a technically 
complex challenge.  In an all-out retaliation scenario, targeting is the simplest.  The US 
arsenal is so large that the numbers of weapons with ensured survival require that they be 
matched to enough high value targets to avoid wasting them.  Targeting for a controlled 
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retaliation requires the creation of a menu of different response packages.  These 
targeting packages need to be tailored to be considered a proportional response, and leave 
enough nuclear weapons afterwards for larger strikes if needed.  Targets can be of at least 
four different classifications, nuclear weapons, conventional forces, political leadership, 
and economic targets5.  While the goal is not to inflict casualties on civilian populations 
they would undoubtedly suffer great losses in the pursuit of these targets.  Retaliating 
against an enemy’s nuclear forces such as silos, submarine bases, bomber bases, and 
nuclear storage facilities is done with the goal of tipping the nuclear balance in America’s 
favor.  Striking at conventional forces prevents the enemy from having an improved 
battlefield position after the initial exchange.  While conventional forces are decidedly 
harder to hit because of their level of mobility the destruction of their support structure 
can be very damaging.  A controlled strike could target conventional forces in a certain 
geographic area creating an area of vulnerability, and clearly demonstrates the limits of 
the attack.  Targeting political leadership and economic centers are the most difficult to 
accomplish.  While the idea of decapitating the enemy’s leadership in a precise attack is 
appealing, having precise intelligence in war or crisis on an enemy’s leadership is 
doubtful.  The targeting of economic centers requires the destruction of their associated 
populations, and may be judged as the deliberate targeting of civilians. 
 Warning that an attack is coming is a key piece of information used by decision 
makers in deciding what response to choose from.  Warnings can be considered either 
strategic or tactical.  An example of “strategic” warning would be the outbreak of a 
conventional war or crisis involving nuclear armed states.  These situations greatly 
increase the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons but may have the uncertainty as to 
when or to what degree they would be used.  In a prolonged crisis it would be difficult to 
keep strategic forces at a high state of readiness without the risk of their performance 
suffering for it.  In a conventional conflict it’s likely that peacetime intelligence gathering 
networks will be disrupted or destroyed, decreasing the accuracy of any perceived 
warning.  An example of “tactical” warning is provided by strategic radar systems and 
satellites, used for monitoring enemy bomber and missile activity.  It’s important to have 
multiple sensor readings to measure the scale of the attack and to ensure that the report is 
credible and is not in error.   
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 After receiving a tactical warning that a nuclear attack has been launched the first 
need of the National Command Authority is an attack assessment.  The time before 
impact can be used to ensure the survivability of mobile forces and the NCA can be 
evacuated or their successors designated.  Post impact data would report the locations and 
scale of the attack, assuming that the means of reporting the damage inflicted survives the 
attack.  
 In response to the assessment of the attack, a decision must be made concerning 
the response to it.  This is the most difficult stage of a nuclear operation because it may 
be constrained by time, the person making the decision may be of questionable legality, 
and the amount of information available may be limited.  The political decision maker 
needs to have been delegated the authority to respond, in case of the destruction of the 
NCA.  In deciding on an all-out attack, the only information required is that an attack has 
occurred.  A controlled response would require information on the attack and what assets 
are available for a response.  The time constraint is the primary factor if a Launch Under 
Attack (LUA) order is given.  This decision is made before the enemy’s nuclear attack 
hits, and gives the NCA full access to their nuclear forces; especially if they are already 
on alert.  ICBMs are the most likely choice under this circumstance, as they require the 
least amount of time to authenticate a launch order and by launching avoid their 
destruction before deployment.  Choosing LUA makes it difficult to determine the target 
and scale of the attack, making it more biased towards an all-out retaliation.  If the 
decision to retaliate is made after the attack has occurred, time will still be a factor.  Back 
up communication systems have limited operating times before their fuel or batteries is 
exhausted and communications cease, and the same is true for strategic bombers and the 
generators that would be powering the ICBMs.  The additional time provided by 
retaliating after the attack has occurred can prove beneficial by using the surviving 
weapons efficiently and allow for better consideration of possible responses. 
 Once a decision has been made by the political NCA, orders must now be 
dispersed by the military command and control structure.  The dispersal of launch orders 
must be made with authentication codes from the commanders to the various units that 
will commit the strike.  Two way communications is vital, as it allows for verification of 
the orders and can allow for clarification of them as well.  Communications under nuclear 
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attack are subject to a number of technical issues, particularly physical destruction and 
disruption from nuclear effects.  The only way to mitigate this issue is to have sufficient 
variety and redundancy of communication systems, to make it improbable that they are 
all inoperable after an attack. 
 Post-attack assessment is the final stage of nuclear retaliation.  In an all-out 
retaliation it is unnecessary, but is important for any lesser exchange in order to control 
further escalation.  It is used to determine the outcome of the exchange, if the war should 
be continued or concluded, the state of remaining nuclear weapons, and coordinating a 
response to the devastation brought on civilian and military centers.                        
4.3 Decision Making Strategies and Theories 
 It is important to recognize the value of how individuals affect the decision 
making process within bureaucratic organizations.  A decision starts at the individual 
bureaucrat level and is then brought up to the policy making group level.  Then one or 
more groups make decisions on the bureaucracy level.  The incorrect way of attempting 
to better understand a government is to ask your self, “If I were the PRC what would I 
do?6”  This erroneous approach is often referred to as “mirror imaging.” 
 An example of the interaction between individuals in a bureaucracy is found in an 
examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Within the U.S. Executive Committee was 
Adlai Stevenson, who was the US ambassador to the UN.  At the start of the crisis when 
they were still formulating what response they should take to the discovery of missiles in 
Cuba, Stevenson suggested that they make a deal with the Soviets.  His suggestion was to 
trade the Soviets the missiles in Cuba for the removal of outdated Jupiter missiles in 
Turkey.  This would prevent the Soviets from being backed into a corner where they 
would be unable to save face.  After Stevenson left the room, he was ridiculed by the 
others for providing a suggestion that they believe could have made the United States 
seem weak.   
 Margaret Hermann identified eight factors where leader characteristics are likely 
to affect foreign policy behavior6: 
1. In proportion to the general interest of the head of state in foreign policy 
2. When the means of assuming power are dramatic 
3. When the head of state is charismatic 
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4. When the head of state has great authority over foreign policy 
5. When the foreign policy organization is less developed and differentiated 
6. In a crisis 
7. When the external national situation is perceived to be ambiguous, the 
information processing systems of the head of state play a key role 
8. The cognitive styles and beliefs of the head of state will affect foreign policy in 
relation to the degree of training in foreign affairs      
 When national leaders attempt to predict the actions of their enemies in crises, 
there are two major theories of how they go about it.  The older theory is known as the 
Past Actions theory, which holds that decision makers assess their enemy’s credibility by 
evaluating their history for keeping or breaking commitments.  The newer theory is the 
Current Calculus theory which postulates that decision makers pay little attention to an 
enemy’s past actions.  Instead, they pay attention to the threats and promises they believe 
are backed by sufficient power, and serve clear interests7.   
 If we were to operate under the notion of Current Calculus theory, then all 
decisions would be based on a nation’s current credibility.  Credibility is difficult to 
define for a number of reasons.  Credibility is a perception; it is dependent upon the 
nation perceiving and the nation being perceived.  Credibility is not tangible and cannot 
be compared against a set metric.  Credibility is not synonymous with seriousness; a 
threat can credible and not serious, vice versa, or a combination of the two.  Lastly, 
credibility can lie anywhere along a continuum from totally unbelievable to entirely 
credible.     
 When leaders calculate credibility in a crisis, they focus on the balance of 
capabilities and the interests at stake.  An enemy’s capabilities or power is determined by 
figuring if he can do what he threatens to do, and if he can do it at a reasonable cost.  
Interests can be categorized into three levels, vital interests, important interests, and 
concerns.  Vital interests are the highest level and are connected with the state’s survival.  
Important interests do not involve the survival of the state, but do have real material 
value.  Concerns are the lowest level and are not connected to the state’s survival and 
have little or no material cost and are ideals or values held by the state.  In crisis, a 
nation’s interests are prioritized, with material interests usually winning over values7.   
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 During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy and his advisor’s were 
almost unanimous about Soviet credibility, despite Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s recent 
series of bluffs during the Berlin Crises from 1958 to 1961.  The President and the 
Executive Committee (Ex Comm) hardly considered the past when making their 
decisions.  What did concern them were three different balances of power.  First was 
balance of conventional forces in the Caribbean, second was the balance of conventional 
forces in Europe, and third and most importantly was the strategic nuclear balance 
between the United States and Soviets.  The United States had the advantage in the 
Caribbean and the Soviets had the advantage in Europe, specifically Berlin, but Soviet 
gains in the strength of their nuclear arsenal had begun the age of mutually assured 
destruction.  The United States could no longer guarantee through the use of a first strike 
the complete elimination of Soviet nuclear assets.   
 The Ex Comm had to develop a response to the discovery of Soviet missiles in 
Cuba and their planning produced five different options.  The first of which was to send 
an ultimatum to Khrushchev, but was quickly disregarded as it was presumed that the 
Soviets would only acknowledge some form of action.  The second option was to impose 
a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent further shipment of missiles and warheads.  The 
third option was a limited airstrike targeting just the missile sites, with the fourth option 
being a large airstrike targeting missile sites and other military targets.  The last and most 
dramatic option would be a large airstrike and a subsequent invasion of Cuba.   
 Their final decision was to install a naval blockade of the island, even though they 
did not believe that a blockade by itself would be sufficient to have the missiles removed 
from Cuba.  They predicted the Soviets reaction would be to escalate the situation.  In 
response, the Soviets could have accelerated construction of missiles sites with materials 
already in Cuba, issue a deterrent threat to the United States that an attack against Cuba 
would trigger an attack against the United States, or they could have moved to squeeze 
the United States out of Berlin7.   
 In the last days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when tensions began to radically 
escalate, Khrushchev sent two letters to the White House outlining a deal to end the 
crisis.  The first offered the removal of the missiles for a US pledge not to invade Cuba 
and the second letter which replaced the first added the requirement of the removal of US 
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Jupiter missiles from Turkey.  Kennedy and the Ex Comm made two import decisions 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis based on Soviet credibility.  The first was choosing to 
blockade rather than strike at Cuba, and the second was accepting the deal with 
Khrushchev despite the fact that a U-2 spy plane had strayed into Soviet air space while 
another reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba, killing the pilot.    
4.4  Governmental Politics Model   
 There are a number of ways to model how national governments make decisions.  
They generally come in three types; the rational actor, the organizational process, and 
governmental politics.  The rational actor is the most simplistic of the models by 
attempting to explain international events based on the aims and calculations of a nation.  
This approach oftentimes oversimplifies by depending heavily upon rationality, that 
nations make consistent, value maximizing choices within specified constraints.    
 At the opposite end of the spectrum is the governmental politics model which sees 
no unitary actor but rather many actors as players.  These players focus not on a single 
strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems, act in terms of no consistent 
set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, 
organizational and personal goals.  Players that make government decisions decide not by 
a single rational choice but by the pulling and hauling of politics.  Graham Allison breaks 
up the governmental politics model into a number sections and subsections in his book 
Essence of Decision2:   
 The Governmental Politics Paradigm 
I.  Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Political Resultant 
 The decisions and actions of governments are resultants in the sense that what 
happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, 
conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence.  Their 
decisions and actions are political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and 
actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among 
individual members of the government. 
 When conducting analysis it is important to distinguish between: 
1. governmental actions that are really agglomerations of relatively independent 
decisions and actions by individuals and groups of players 
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2. formal governmental decisions or actions that represent a combination of the 
preferences and relative influence of central players to the game 
3. formal governmental decisions and actions that represent a combination of the 
preferences and relative influence of a special subset of players in the game 
II.  Organizing Concepts 
 There are numerous factors that influence the dynamics of a government’s 
decision making body.  The player being the basic unit in any group, its important to 
analyze what factors influence them which in turn have an effect on the group,  
A. The Players and their Positions 
 Positions define the formal role of individual, what they can and cannot do. 
B. The Players’ Stands and Perceptions 
 The individual’s perceptions and interests are what will lead him to take a stand 
on an issue.  Their interests are a combination of national security, domestic interests, 
personal interests, and their personal conception of their role in the government.  A stand 
is the result of a deadline or event forcing a player to choose a side of an issue depending 
on their goals, interests and which channel the issue is raised on. 
C. The Players’ Impact on Results 
 A players’ impact on results is a direct result of their level of power in the 
organization, or their effective influence on government decisions and actions.  Power is 
a blend of bargaining advantages, skill in using bargaining advantages, and other players’ 
perceptions of the first two.  Bargaining advantages stem from authority, responsibility, 
control over resources, expertise, control over information to define the problem, the 
ability to affect other players’ objectives in other games, and personal persuasion via 
personal relations or charisma.  Power that is wisely invested yields enhanced reputation 
for effectiveness and poor use of power depletes capital and reputation.   
D. The Players’ Game 
 The game is where a player’s stands, influence, and moves combine to yield 
governmental decision and action.  The game depends on action channels, rules, and 
action as political resultant to exist.  Action channels determine who the power players 
are and whose organizations will be responsible for the action when a decision is made.  
The rules can be the laws of the nation, court rulings, culture, international laws such as 
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treaties or a combination of them.  The rules can be clear and constant or fuzzy and 
changing.  All government action that involves players is the result of political action.  
How the politics plays out depends on the environment of the game, the pace of the 
game, the structure of the game, and the reward of the game. 
III.  Dominant Inference Pattern 
 If a nation performed an action, that action was the result of bargaining among 
individuals and groups within the government.  This model’s explanatory power is 
achieved by displaying the game, the action channel, the positions, the players, their 
preferences, and the pulling and hauling that yielded as a resultant, the action in question. 
IV.  General Propositions 
 In order to form an analysis the following are required: the rules of the game, the 
importance of skill, reputation and other characteristics that players bring to positions, the 
distribution of advantages and disadvantages, and individual players’ valuation of 
alternative payoffs.  These propositions can be divided into a number of categories.   
 A.  Political Resultants 
 Depends on the preferences of individual players, advantages and disadvantages 
of each player from one action channel to another, and the    
 B.  Action and Intention 
 Action does not presuppose government intention.  Most resultants emerge from 
games among players who perceive quite different faces of an issue and whom differ 
markedly on the actions they prefer.  Actions rarely follow from an agreed doctrine in 
which all players concur.  Actions consisting of a number of pieces that have emerged 
from a number of games rarely reflect a coordinated strategy and thus are difficult to read 
as conscious signals. 
 C.  Problems and Solutions 
 Players focus not on the total strategic problem but on the decision that must be 
made today or tomorrow.  When confronting a deadline, Chiefs focus on an issue and 
look for a solution while Indians, having become committed to a solution for an earlier, 
different problem, seek a problem that somewhat fits.  
 D.  Where you stand depends on where you sit 
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 The diverse horizontal demands on each player shape his priorities, perceptions, 
and issues. 
 E.  Chiefs and Indians 
 The interaction between a player or Chief, and his subordinates or Indians is an 
important factor on how the player will decide amongst his options.  When looking down 
on an issue a Chief looks for options.  Looking up on an issue Indians need to attract the 
attention of their Chief and be able to promote confidence in the option they present.  
Other Chiefs look sideways on an issue to determine which option among the Chiefs they 
can commit to.   
 F.  The 51-49 Principle 
 Because he must compete with others, the player is forced to argue much more 
confidently than he would if he were a detached judge. 
 G.  Inter and Intra-national Relations 
 The actions of one nation affect those of another to the degree that they result in 
advantages and disadvantages for the players in the second nation. 
 H.  The face of the issue differs from seat to seat 
 I.  Misperception 
 J.  Misexpectation 
 K.  Miscommunication  
 L.  Reticence 
 Hesitant silence, partially intended soft-spokeness; reduces leaks, provides an ill 
focused target of attack, or a proposal that never moves.   
 M.  Styles of Play 
  Individuals play the game differently depending on how they entered it: 
bureaucratic careerists, civilian or military, lateral entry, political appointee.    
V.  Specific Propositions 
   A.  Nuclear Crises 
1.  The decision to use nuclear weapons is less likely to occur when the political leader 
has control than when a military leader has control 
2.  The probability the United States will use more force increases when the President, 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of 
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State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the CIA favor 
military action 
3.  In a nuclear crisis formal decision making groups will not be used such as the National 
Security Council, rather an ad hoc group will be used 
4.  The individuals’ perceptions will differ radically on the issue 
   B.  Military Action 
1.  Short of nuclear war, decision and implementation will be delayed while proponents 
attempt to convince opponents 
2.  Major military decisions involve decisions by large plurality, not simple Presidential 
decision 
3.  No military action is taken without extensive consultation of military players 
4.5   Soviet Decision Making Structure 
 The Soviet and American approaches to strategic issues are similar in the weapon 
systems that they employ and the diplomatic techniques used in arms limitations.  
However, they differed sharply on the uses, limitations, and purposes of military power, 
as well as the rules to govern it8.  For example, the Soviets strongly disagreed with the 
Western theories of limited war and the idea of a limited nuclear exchange. 
  The Soviet purposes of war are drawn heavily from the writings of Carl von 
Clausewitz and Marxism-Leninism.  Unlike western strategists, they find it impossible to 
remove the politics from conflict, under the theory that war is the continuation of politics 
under different means.  This is why the western policies of keeping the status quo by 
mutually assured destruction seemed unfamiliar to them.  The Soviets believed that the 
superpower relationship between themselves and the United States was dominated by 
irreconcilable conflict and laden with dangers of war sufficient to oblige their planners to 
undertake every measure for its eventuality.  Operating under the belief that war was 
inevitable, they took steps to ensure victory even when considering the results of a 
nuclear engagement.   
 The Soviets focused on developing their conventional forces and insured against 
anticipated needs by acquiring large numbers of men and material.  The SALT treaties 
allowed them to keep their strategic forces even while pursuing advances in their theater 
forces.   
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 The United States acted under its own belief of limited nuclear war when it 
developed a national C3I system for determining if a nuclear strike was limited.  In their 
nuclear planning, the United States made sure that under a limited strike they would 
damage Soviet C3I systems.  However, the Soviets had no intention of conducting a 
limited strike in a nuclear war, unless is served to achieve the war aim or to re-establish 
or maintain the initiative in conflict.  If it came to nuclear war, the Soviet strategy was the 
exact opposite of the American one.  Their objective was the rapid and wholesale 
destruction of the United States and its allies’ ability to wage nuclear war.  They planned 
on attacking command and control systems at the outset of any strategic nuclear 
exchange in an effort to disrupt and degrade American military, political, and 
administrative control, and our industrial capacity8.    
 The Soviet perspective on making strategic decisions was very different on how 
they viewed similar elements.  Their doctrine outlined three major contingencies for 
nuclear war.  The first was a surprise nuclear attack against the Soviet Union with few 
prior indicators and little time to implement countermeasures.  The second was a 
prolonged superpower confrontation or crisis that resulted in nuclear war which would 
provide Soviet leadership adequate time to prepare for a possible attack.  The third 
contingency is nuclear war as a result of escalation from a major conventional war with 
the West. 
 Soviet strategic leadership can be divided into three categories; intelligence, 
political decision making and control, and military decision making and control.  
Intelligence in this context refers to the ability of Soviet political and military leaders to 
know what is happening in an accurate and timely manner.  Political decision making and 
control is the ability of the political leadership to understand the intelligence they receive, 
issue directives based on that intelligence, and to see that their directives are carried out.  
Military decision making and control is the implementation of political decisions as 
military action.   
 It is not entirely certain what the National Command Authority (NCA) of the 
Soviet Union might have been, if it had to transition from peace time to nuclear war 
under surprise attack conditions.  There are three possible political structures that might 
fill the role of the NCA, the Politburo, the Defense Council, or the Secretary General.  
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The Politburo is the highest political decision making body in the Soviet Union and 
effectively runs the country, and is made up of 10-16 full members.  The Politburo is led 
by the Secretary General.  Its closest American equivalent would be if the President and 
his cabinet ran the country with limited, to no congressional oversight.  The second 
possibility is the Defense Council which is a subcommittee of the Politburo chaired by 
the General Secretary, and its members are the ministers of defense and foreign affairs, 
the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the State Planning Committee, 
and the head of the KGB.  The most likely candidate is the General Secretary, as he is the 
commander in chief of their armed forces much like our President is to ours5. 
 What is unknown is how the Soviets would handle a transition of nuclear release 
authority, if the primary NCA were eliminated or out of communication.  Since 
peacetime political succession has proved to be difficult for the Soviets, it is uncertain if 
the minister of defense or a second secretary of the party would take over as their 
commander in chief.  It is possible that their belief in the surprise attack being the least 
likely scenario, that they have put off this decision until the time comes.   
 Political control during a surprise attack involves redundant measures that include 
prevention of unauthorized nuclear weapons use.  The Soviet equivalent of the American 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) would be the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).  At the 
outset of their ICBM and IRBM programs, the warheads were kept separate from the 
delivery vehicles and under the control of the KGB.  It was not until the late 1960s that 
this policy was changed.  Advances in American ICBMs meant that the Soviets no longer 
had the luxury of early warning from American bombers, and risked the destruction of 
their forces before a retaliatory strike could be launched.  While this lessened political 
control, the majority of the Soviet officer corp. were members of the Communist Party, 
and almost all officers involved with nuclear weapons were members.  The KGB 
continued to have a covert rather than overt role in ensuring political control over nuclear 
weapons by placing large numbers of agents and informants in the officer corp.   
 Soviet analysts believed that the possibility of nuclear war arising from a 
superpower crisis was much more likely than that of a surprise attack.  The factors that 
Soviet intelligence gatherers looked for, in determining the escalation of a crisis are 
essential to understand.  Soviet intelligence is collected by two agencies, the KGB and 
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the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).  The types of intelligence 
gathered can be classified as either hard or soft.  Soft intelligence is based on unfolding 
political developments, information gathered by Soviet embassy personnel, or Soviet 
journalists with sources in American political circles.  They believe that soft indicators 
will most likely precede hard indicators but soft intelligence is by its nature less accurate.  
Hard intelligence includes signals intelligence from military and command and control 
sources, satellite photoreconnaissance and the reports from base watchers whom monitor 
base security, movement of personnel and weapons, and changes in alert status.  The 
Soviets believed no one factor can indicate with absolute certainty that a crisis is 
escalating, which is why they gather information from such a diverse spread of sources. 
 Political and strategic decisions in times of crisis are made by the Politburo, and 
are a product of group dynamics.  All political power is usually concentrated in a few key 
individuals creating an inner circle and outer circle of Politburo members.  Their political 
power is most likely personal rather than positional, as the membership of this inner 
circle has changed over time.  The existence of the Defense Council has skewed its 
members towards the inner circle.  Individuals, who repeatedly disagree with the views 
held by the inner circle, are oftentimes expelled from the Politburo.   
 The protection of the NCA is held in high regard by Soviets with numerous 
hardened bunkers in the Moscow area for the NCA and their support staff.  Their 
behavior during a crisis can be construed as a message towards the West of their intent.  
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, members of the Politburo were seen attending a concert, 
as opposed to having moved into their hardened bunkers.  Since their people were largely 
unaware of the crisis as it was happening, this gesture could not have been directed at 
them5.    
 Military preparations would increase from peacetime levels during a crisis.  A 
detectable indication of this would be the activation of numerous redundant 
communication systems.  Radio communications in the low, high, and very high 
bandwidths systems would activate and mobile radio relay systems would be dispersed.  
The use of communication satellites would likely increase as well.  The activation of 
cable communication systems which may be hardened could also be activated, with each 
service having their own system.  The Strategic Rocket Forces would be brought to a 
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higher alert level and may disperse some of their mobile launcher units.  Soviet ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBN) would likely be surged from port.  Soviet naval planners have 
taken the opposite approach for ensuring the survivability of their SSBNs at sea by 
creating bastions for them.  These bastions would be encirclements of surface ships, 
attack submarines and naval aircraft in Soviet controlled waters.  Deployment of these 
bastions would be clear indicators of how serious the Soviets viewed the crisis.  Strategic 
bombers would be dispersed in a similar fashion to their American counterparts in order 
make them a smaller target.   
 A nuclear attack from the Soviets in a crisis state would consist primarily of their 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and their Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles (ICBM), as they provide the least amount of warning time.  SLBMs provide a 
maximum warning time of approximately 15 minutes and as little as five, while ICBMs 
provide approximately 30 minutes of warning time.  Soviet planners will have targeted 
American Command, Control, and Communications (C3) facilities with the first wave of 
SLBMs, before the arrival of their ICBMs.  The ICBMs would be designated for 
hardened targets such as American ICBM silos and their control centers.   
 If a conventional war between the West and the Soviet Union were to begin, 
Soviet military thinking indicates they would prefer not to use their tactical nuclear 
weapons.  Their fear of NATO tactical nuclear weapons would have them be a primary 
target early in the conflict, including the destruction of NATO nuclear storage facilities 
air bases, air defenses, and theater command and control.  
 The Soviets will be monitoring for NATO preparations of their theater nuclear 
weapons, using their intelligence resources placed in NATO countries prior to the 
conflict and through battlefield analysis.  Movement of missile troops, suspension of 
tactical aviation, and implementing measures to protect their own troops would all be 
signs monitored by the Soviets.  Some factors could be easily misinterpreted, such as the 
dispersal of NATO cruise missile systems to protect them from a Soviet strike, looks the 
same as dispersal prior to launch.  
 Political control of the situation would be held entirely by the State Defense 
Committee and any ministers selected to join them.  They would be in near constant 
communication with General Staff, receiving updates on the progress of the war and 
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issuing directives concerning the missions of the armed forces and the means to fulfill 
their mission requirements.  The decision to use nuclear weapons rests solely on this 
body.  If theater nuclear weapons were exchanged between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
nations, Soviet leaders believed escalation beyond this level could be avoided by the 
United States and Soviet Union refraining from making strikes on each other’s homeland.  
This belief caused considerable tension between the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
nations; however the resistance to having nuclear weapons placed within their borders 
and outside of their control was squashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968.   
 During wartime a dramatic shift occurs at the highest levels of the Soviet military 
with the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command which serves the 
State Defense Committee in advising it on military affairs.  Its membership would 
include the General Secretary of the Communist party, the minister of defense, the chief 
of the General Staff, the commanders in chief of the armed services, and deputy defense 
ministers.  It is through the General Staff that the Supreme High Command will issue the 
release of nuclear weapons on whatever scale they see fit.   
 A number of Soviet ground and air forces would hold nuclear weapons at or near 
the front but they do not have the authority to release them on their own.  Front 
commanders can request the release of nuclear weapons for use in theater by devising a 
battlefield nuclear strike plan.  The general staff uses the battlefield nuclear strike plans 
from their front commanders to create and update the general nuclear strike plan.  The 
Soviets would have a number of factors to consider when committing to a nuclear strike.  
They could decide to strike early in the conflict, while more unlikely, with Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) which they classify under theater weapons to take 
advantage of tightly grouped NATO forces.  The more likely scenario would be if a 
conflict between the Soviet Union and NATO lasted for a month or more, and front 
nuclear systems are out of communication or used delivering conventional weapons 
earlier in the conflict or destroyed.  The use of IRBMs would certainly result in nuclear 
strikes against the Soviet Union and further nuclear escalation.     
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4.6 US Decision Making Structure 
 The control of the United States’ nuclear weapons can be divided into two distinct 
Clausewitzian groups; provincial control and political control.  Provincial control is the 
control of the armed forces from the perspective of military objectives and the efficient 
use of their resources.  Political control is the command system of statecraft and grand 
strategy.  A simple example of this is that the civilian government makes the decision to 
go to war, not the military, but it is the military that controls the details of its execution.   
 The command authority of nuclear weapons is held by the commander in chief of 
the armed forces, the President of the United States.  The strategic weapons are then 
controlled by the US Strategic Command or STRATCOM.   
 During peacetime operations, the President has full control of all strategic assets.  
The President can communicate his orders through the proper chain of command, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in order to accomplish 
his goals.  It is during nuclear war that the situation changes dramatically with the 
possibility of destruction or incapacitation of the National Command Authority (NCA).   
 If the President were to be destroyed or out of communication, the nation would 
lose its ability to launch a retaliatory strike.  That is why each President is briefed on their 
available options if such a situation were to occur.  The possible decisions that the 
President can make can be generalized into four possible choices5: 
1. Ignore the problem altogether by the belief that the possibility of nuclear war is so 
minute 
2. Retain personal control of all nuclear weapons and make no provisions for the 
transfer of authority 
3. Rely on political succession as specified by law starting with the Vice President 
4. Authorize the establishment of an alternate mechanism of authority different from 
political succession to be used only in dire circumstances 
 The first two options can swiftly be eliminated.  The first choice would result in 
the president tacitly approving past procedures by the act of not changing them.  The 
second option is eliminated by the fact that it would be illegal for the President to prevent 
his successor from having all possible options available.  It also invites attack on the 
President as the means of preventing any retaliatory strike.    
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 The third option is specified in the Constitution and the 1947 Presidential 
Succession Act.  After the President and Vice President, executive authority would be 
transferred to the Speaker of the House, then to the president pro tempore of the Senate, 
and then to the Cabinet executives in the order of their office’s creation.  The risk with 
this option is that most of these individuals work in the Washington D.C. area, and a 
surprise attack has the possibility of eliminating most of them.  Then there is the issue of 
briefing someone who may have no experience with the military or the nation’s strategic 
assets.  The fourth option would be that the President has pre-delegated a replacement 
NCA to handle strategic decision making if all the presidential successors were 
eliminated or could not be found in a timely manner.  If the nation were to fall under 
nuclear attack, time would be a critical factor in getting orders to commanders before 
communications or retaliatory systems were eliminated.   
 If the entire political leadership of the country were eliminated or out of 
communication, the President may delegate second strike authority to a military 
commander.  This act has the intention of ensuring a response, but has as many risks as 
the political succession listed above.  A political statesman is supposed to have the best 
interests of state as their primary motivator in decision making; a military officer may 
have a different mindset and order a counterattack greater than the enemy’s initial attack 
in order to punish them.  This could prevent war termination in a way that is favorable to 
the United States and the world.  Another risk would be to have delegation too 
decentralized and have a number of officers with the command authority to release 
nuclear weapons.  This could make it difficult if not impossible to control escalation. 
 The process of alerting America’s nuclear forces in times of crisis or war is based 
on the judgment of the president.  His orders are passed to the secretary of defense, then 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who through their commands, have the orders carried out by 
the various weapon commanders.  This chain of command for conventional and nuclear 
weapons is outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 in which different levels 
of defensive conditions (DEFCON) were established.  The DEFCON levels range from 5 
to 1, with 5 being lowest level at peacetime and 1 being troops are deployed and conflict 
is imminent.  DEFCON 5 and 4 are used during normal operations.  It is when the 
DEFCON is set to 3 or higher that the military command and control structure begins to 
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increasingly tighten.  DEFCON orders are to the interpretation of the commander beyond 
their minimum requirements.  This allows political and military leaders of the NCA some 
flexibility in adjusting forces depending on the situation. 
 At DEFCON 3 the military is placed on high alert status.  Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) crews become more vigilant and the materials required to 
prepare for launch are brought to their consoles.  STRATCOM is the military 
organization responsible for America’s strategic weapon systems.  In addition to 
heightening the alert of missile crews SAC would order strategic bombers to be placed on 
strip alert, making them ready to fly at short notice.  Redundant communication systems 
are activated and prepared for use while secondary command and control stations are 
prepared in case of evacuation of the primary.  The Navy would prepare to put to sea its 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that are in port at the time.  During the Cold War, the 
United States kept large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO countries.  During 
peacetime approximately 450 tactical nuclear weapons were kept on alert, but at 
DEFCON 3 this figure could grow to over 2,000 and would include ground-launched 
cruise missiles, nuclear gravity bombs delivered by aircraft, and NATO committed 
SSBNs.    
 At DEFCON 2 the government and the military deploys troops for combat in 
order to achieve maximum strength if war does occur.  Civilian and military leaders 
would be disbursed to a number of protected facilities in the Washington DC area and 
around the country.  The most important groups could act as a number of emergency 
governments in case of attack.  The Vice President, as the President’s immediate 
successor would likely be transferred to an emergency airborne command post or other 
undisclosed location.  SAC would attain as close to full strategic bomber strength as 
possible and would disperse the aircraft to a number of airfields nation wide, with the 
exception of any dual purpose (conventional or strategic) aircraft already committed to 
conventional missions.  The Navy would surge any submarines or ships that were not 
under extensive overhaul or deployed at the DEFCON 3 level.  Tactical nuclear weapons 
would be dispersed in Cold War Europe to field storage sites away from their storage 
bunkers.  The storage sites would be a considerable distance from units designated for 
using the warheads, until authorization for their employment occurs.   
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 At DEFCON 1 the outbreak of war is imminent and can be considered a warning 
that an attack will occur.  In a conventional war with Soviet Union both sides would 
target the other’s military command and control resources which in turn support their 
nuclear operations as well.  A casualty on the onset of conflict could be the ballistic 
missile early warning system, which greatly reduce the United States’ or the Soviet 
Union’s ability to accurately gauge the strength of a nuclear attack.  It is also likely that 
anti-satellite weapons will be employed to blind the United States and wreak havoc on its 
communication network.  NATO strategy for tactical nuclear weapons in this scenario is 
to use them only as a last resort if Soviets use their tactical nuclear weapons first or if a 
Soviet victory appears likely.    
 The Soviet reaction to a level 2 or 3 alert is highly speculative.  At the declaration 
of DEFCON 3, Soviet forces would likely increase their reconnaissance of US forces and 
ready their forces in the face of increased American activity.  Examples of these actions 
would include increasing anti-carrier forces, tracking carrier task forces or adding to the 
protecting elements of their SSBNs.  Their nuclear forces would likely be prepared for, 
but would not disperse until the situation changed.  Unlike the United States system of 
DEFCONs, the Soviets are able to heighten the alert status of their conventional forces 
without raising the alert of nuclear forces an equal amount.  At DEFCON 2 it is harder to 
predict how intense a Soviet reaction would be.  It is likely that they will activate their 
war time command and control systems and disperse their nuclear forces.  Beyond are 
two options of varying aggressiveness.   The first option in defense against a NATO 
invasion is to have their nuclear forces fully prepared with general mobilization declared.  
This stops just short of war, but with both sides in such heightened states and close 
proximity, the possibility of an error occurring and starting the conflict is very high.  The 
second option is more drastic, and involves the Soviets using their tactical nuclear 
weapons in a disarming first strike.  This option is highly unlikely, but would provide the 
Soviets with the opportunity to eliminate NATO’s nuclear infrastructure while it is more 
vulnerable.       
4.7 PRC Decision Making Structure  
 One of the newer military strategies being discussed by the Chinese military, The 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is a concept known as War Control.  War control 
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includes preventing and delaying the outbreak of war, and avoiding the escalation of war 
once it breaks out.  It stresses the comprehensive employment of military, political, 
economic, diplomatic, and other means, but certainly does not neglect the role of the 
military in realizing the strategic objective.  There are three stages of War Control; 
resolution of the dispute before war, preventing or postponing war, and once war has 
broken out controlling the scale, pace, scope or intensity.  Chinese military thinkers have 
noted several changes in the global context for armed conflict.  The advent of war under 
high-technology conditions facilitates the ability to direct large military operations from 
afar in real time.  Also, among nuclear-armed states, unlimited warfare is far too 
dangerous.  No major power faces such a grave threat to its existence that it would be 
willing to escalate uncontrollably.  It is the PLA’s belief that the era of total war is over, 
and a shift to War Control, which was first recorded in 1998, will be brought about as 
they modernize around 20209.   
 China’s nuclear posture in the 1950s was shaped by the need to defend itself from 
American hegemony, and after the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union.  They viewed 
American deterrence as coercion, by the U.S. policy of reserving the right to commit a 
first strike.  The Chinese goal is to maintain nuclear weapons as a means of defense only, 
and to stockpile a number of nuclear weapons that they deem to be the minimum reprisal.  
The operational concepts associated with their wartime use of strategic forces are: 
1. Absorb the first blow, counter attack, and re-attack as necessary 
2. Counterdeterennce 
3. Key point counterstrike 
4. Demonstrate resolve 
5. Maintain control of the overall situation 
 If deterrence fails, PLA writings indicate that the Second Artillery, the Chinese 
military organization responsible for their strategic nuclear weapons, would conduct 
retaliatory strikes.  It would do so for the purpose of de-escalation, and perhaps, war 
termination.  The Chinese views on the use of retaliatory nuclear strikes with the intent of 
de-escalation are explained through a number of concepts.  The first concept is gaining 
mastery after the enemy has struck10.  This concept is taken seriously by the PLA as sign 
of their devotion to no first use of nuclear weapons, but the difficult issue is determining 
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when an enemy crosses the first use line.  It is plausible that the Chinese may interpret the 
detection of missile launches or strikes against their strategic assets as a first use, and 
would conceivably respond with nuclear arms.  The second core concept on the use of 
retaliatory nuclear strikes is self protection, or ensuring the survival of their strategic 
assets for a retaliatory response.  The third concept is, key point counter-strike.  This 
entails choosing enemy targets that if struck, will cripple the enemy’s war effort and 
provide a psychological shock to dissuade them from continuing11.   
 The Second Artillery has a system of three classes of readiness to which its units 
must adhere.  Under normal conditions, the firing units are at “Third Class” status.  In this 
status, forces train, conduct exercises and conduct normal maintenance.  If the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) receives some intelligence that the enemy may use nuclear 
weapons, the CMC directs units to raise their readiness level to “Second Class” warning 
status.  At this status, units must either prepare to move into firing positions or actually 
deploy to firing positions, many of which can be tunnels or prepared underground 
protected positions.  The highest readiness status is “First Class Warning.”  At “First 
Class Warning” status, missile forces are fully ready to fire and are either deployed, or in 
combat positions and with their support elements, warheads, and fuel, waiting for a 
launch order. 
 Of the five original nuclear armed weapon states, China alone is believed to be 
increasing its nuclear arsenal, boosting its numbers by roughly 25 percent since 2005. 
It is estimated that China now has approximately 176 deployed warheads, plus an 
unknown number of stored warheads, for a total stockpile of approximately 240 
warheads.  Actually estimating the size and composition of the Chinese nuclear stockpile 
is exceedingly difficult because China does not publicize details about its nuclear forces.  
Over the coming decade, China is expected to deploy more warheads on new systems, 
but it will also retire others as it phases out older systems.  The most important nuclear 
development of the last two years in China has been its deployment of the new DF-31 
and DF-31A missiles.  The DF-31A is a solid-fueled, three-stage intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM), with a range of over 11,200 kilometers (7,000 miles).   
 China has only one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 
at this time and is building at least two and possibly five, Jin-class SSBNs.  This has the 
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potential of providing China with a constant at sea SSBN presence.  This would be a 
dramatic change, since China has no experience with operating SSBNs, as its single 
operational SSBN has never gone on patrol.  China also posses the nuclear capable DH-
10 land attack cruise missile, which can be fired from aircraft or the ground, with a range 
of 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles).  It is uncertain how many DH-10s China possess, 
though estimates range from 50 to 250, and what fraction of these are nuclear capable is 
unknown12.  China will seek to maintain a status quo power relationship with the United 
States.  If the United States continues to improve its ballistic missile defense systems, 
China will most likely increase its stockpiles of nuclear weapons to a point where they 
feel that they can overwhelm US defenses.     
 The upper reaches of the PRC consists of several levels.  At the very top are 25-
35 policy makers, the Preeminent Leader, elder advisors, a small number of generalists, 
and several clusters of specialists.  The top 25-35 consists of most of the Politburo and 
Secretariat of the CCP, Standing Committee of the State Council, top commanders of the 
military, and the leaders of the largest and wealthiest cities and provinces.  The State 
Council is the highest organ of state administration.  It is composed of the Premier, Vice-
Premiers, State Councilor, Ministers in charge of ministries and commission, the Auditor-
General, and the Secretary-General.  Except for the Premier who is nominated by the 
President, Vice-Premiers and State Councilor are nominated by the Premier.  They are all 
appointed by the President upon the approval of the National People's Congress.  The 
State Council reports directly to the NPC.  The Standing Committee consists of only the 
Premier, Vice Premiers, and state councilors13.   
 The Preeminent Leader appoints people at high levels of government, and is 
responsible for enunciation of ideological principles, and identification of primary tasks 
facing the nation.  The elder advisors, of which there are typically four to seven, are 
highly influential, semi-retired leaders who command the loyalty of select bureaucracies 
and ideological allies.  They are, within limits, capable of challenging the Preeminent 
Leader.   
 Below the Premier and his elder advisors are the generalists.  They are the chief 
lieutenants of the Premier and have widespread responsibilities.  The generalists seek to 
integrate the diverse Chinese bureaucracy into a coherent whole by resolving major 
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bureaucratic conflicts and deciding major policy issues.  The functional specialists 
assume responsibility for managing foreign affairs, the economy, military affairs, 
ideology, culture, propaganda, science and technology, agriculture, core Party affairs, 
legal and judicial systems, and public security.  While the specialists are generally 
beneath the generalists there have been cases of individuals having roles in both areas.   
 The influence wielded by a policy maker is not based entirely on their formal title.  
It stems from their seniority within the Party, ties to the Preeminent Leader, and their 
network of individuals scattered among the bureaucracies who owe him loyalty and look 
to him for guidance.   
 There is a significant amount of overlap between decision making bodies.  The 
top 25-35 meet in the Politburo of the CCP, including the Secretariat of the CCP, the 
Standing Committee of the State Council, and the Military Affairs Commission.  The 
State Council directs and administrates national defense work, and the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) directs and assumes unified command of the nation's armed forces.  
The chairman of the CMC is elected by the NPC, and the choice of other members is 
decided on by the NPC or its Standing Committee according to the nomination by the 
chairman of the CMC.  The CMC chairman assumes overall responsibility for the work 
of the CMC and is responsible to the NPC, and has the power to make final decisions on 
matters within the functions and authority of the CMC.  The Chairman of the CMC has a 
superior level of authority, if not the ultimate authority, for the use of nuclear weapons.  
It is unlikely that his decisions would require a consensus within the CMC, or among 
senior military leaders14.  The Chinese military does not seem to have a pre-delegated 
power to launch nuclear weapons, when the political leadership is unavailable. 
 Headed by the Chief of General Staff, the Department of General Staff (DGS) 
serves as the headquarters for the ground forces and contains directorates for the three 
other armed services: the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy (PLAN), and the 
Second Artillery.  In general, strategic and military decisions from the Politburo or the 
CMC become operational orders at the DGS level, flow through the Military Regions 
(MR), and arrive at a main-force unit.  Orders to regional forces also pass through the 
provincial level. 
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 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) underwent an awakening in the early 1990s.  
Previously it had been dependant on Soviet style ground forces and tactics that used their 
overwhelming manpower to defeat their enemy.  Three events occurred that changed 
their attitudes and brought about the start of the current Chinese modernization 
movement.  The first was the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, and the resulting 
legislation that placed restrictions on China that were seen as a threat.  The second event 
was the overwhelming American and allied victory over Iraq in the first gulf war.  Iraq 
and China used similar Soviet hardware, and that war demonstrated what a high tech 
force with air superiority could accomplish.  The last factor was the perception that 
Taiwanese leaders were moving towards irreversible separation15.  This was unacceptable 
to Chinese leaders and would be the most likely cause of a conflict between China and 
the West.   
 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that foreign 
deliveries to China of major conventional weapons  totaled $2.58 billion from 1992-1995, 
$3.59 billion from 1995-1999, and $10.26 billion from 2000-2003.  In 2006 the Pentagon 
reported that China now has the third largest defense budget in the world, estimating that 
it spent between $70 and $105 billion on defense that year.  The Chinese attempted to 
cover up their total expenditures, reporting the spending of $35 billion on defense for the 
year15.   
 The United States and China will continue to be economic partners for the 
foreseeable future, but the relationship will not rise to the level of a friendship or alliance.  
This is due to the difference in values between the United States being a democracy and 
the PRC being an autocratic police state.  China has taken steps to improve its relations 
with the West, and has made internal reforms.  They have adopted pragmatic capitalistic 
economic policies which have resulted in unprecedented economic growth.  The overall 
scope of their oppression has shrunk.  While political activism against the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) is still prohibited, most ordinary Chinese are not harassed in 
their daily lives.  In dealing with other countries the Chinese have become more 
cooperative; however, they still have a tendency to blame adversaries for any impasse.  
They always view their offers as generous, and the objections of others as narrow minded 
and mean spirited16.  
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 As with most countries, China’s foreign policy is dictated by their national 
interests.  The PRC is very sensitive about how it is treated in the international 
community; it demands that it be treated with equality and the respect due to a great 
power.  The United States and PRC are dealing with each other with two handed policies.  
Both nations are highly dependant on the other for their continued economic success, but 
both their militaries train in exercises simulating the other as an enemy19.   
 The current situation between the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan is similar 
to the Cuban Missile Crisis between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba.  Both 
involve two nuclear superpowers with a serious risk that the nearby superpower will 
attack the island in a manner the distant superpower would find unacceptable.  Taiwan is 
a core territorial issue in China.  Preventing Taiwan from declaring independence is 
necessary in China’s view to maintain their sovereignty and cohesion.  In the American 
view, defending Taiwan is important to maintaining U.S. credibility in that we will 
protect democracy and fulfill promises to protect friendly nations.  A key difference 
between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Taiwan issue is that relations between 
Washington and Beijing are much better than they were between Washington and 
Moscow at the time, as well as the relations between Beijing and Taipei compared to 
Washington and Havana.      
4.8 Eastern Thought Process 
 The United States and China differ greatly in their NCAs and the way they view 
nuclear weapons.   The explanation for this may be found in basic cultural differences 
that lead the peoples of the United States and China to think and act differently.    
 Eastern and Western peoples have distinctly different thought processes.  
Traditional Western thought, as found in the United States and other English speaking 
nations can trace its origins back to the philosophers of ancient Greece.  Traditional 
Eastern thought, which is similar in China, Japan, and Korea, has its origins in Confucian 
beliefs.  A person’s thought process is developed from an early age.  Before their children 
even learn to speak, parents in both cultures shape how their minds will work.  Neither 
thought process can be deemed superior to the other, as they both have advantages and 
disadvantages when compared to one another. 
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 Greek culture formed along the coast of islands with mountainous interiors.  This 
land promoted the herding of livestock, fishing, trading, and hunting.  These ways of life 
were highly independent, as tasks could be carried out by either a single person or by a 
small group.  This independence carried over into their early forms of government where 
the debate and election became central to deciding issues.  From debate, the Greeks were 
able to develop the concept of logic.  They believed that the world consisted of discrete 
parts which could be broken down and analyzed separately.  From this belief came the 
concept of elements and the scientific method.  The Greeks were also exposed to a 
number of outside cultures and races, and were willing to learn from them as long as the 
foreign ideas could be tested in debate17.     
 Chinese culture formed along agricultural lines.  Crops such as rice, were very 
labor intensive and required large numbers of people in order to properly cultivate them.  
This resulted in a more hierarchal formation of society, where the head of a family was 
typically the elder and their instructions were followed without question.  Persons within 
the family would feel very connected to each other, but feel very different from those 
outside it.  The Chinese viewed the world as a complex place where it was impossible to 
isolate one part of it.  Everything had to be considered in the context it was given in.  
This belief, in the harmony of all things, would become the core of their thinking; as 
logic was to the Greeks.  This manner of thinking does not lend itself to breaking down 
things, but rather understanding the big picture.  China was also more isolated than 
Greece, and those cultures who they did encounter were not as advanced as themselves.  
This resulted in the Chinese developing a lack of curiosity in outside cultures and a 
strong belief in the superiority of Chinese ways.  This is exemplified by the fact that they 
referred to themselves as the Middle Kingdom, or the place between heaven and earth, 
which is another way of saying that they are at the center of the universe.   
 Modern eastern and western societies reflect these differences of history.  
American families instill a sense of independence very early, starting with having 
children sleep in a room or bed separate from the parents, where as Eastern families’ 
children often start by sharing a bed with their parents.  Westerners raise their children to 
communicate as transmitters, while easterners raise their children to communicate as 
receivers.  English is a “subject prominent” language, with nouns being the most 
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distinguishable part of sentences.  Sinitic languages such Chinese, Japanese, or Korean 
are “topic prominent” languages where context and verbs are more important.  
Westerners are more concerned with advancing themselves, while easterners are more 
concerned with advancing the group as a whole.  Easterners see change as constant, that 
everything is in motion and impossible to isolate while westerners see change as limited.          
 Confucian ideology is based on the concepts of hierarchical relationships, respect 
for authority, harmony, and conflict avoidance.  In Confucian terms a leader should strive 
to be a “superior man.”  Leaders in this perspective are to be role models for their 
followers, exemplifying the values of benevolence, duty, wisdom, and reliability.  The 
relationship between leader and follower is described in a number of ways, including 
ruler/subject, father/son, husband/wife, older brother/younger brother.  The ruler/subject 
denotes the absolute loyalty a leader demands from followers.  Father/son is the absolute 
authority a leader has over followers.  Husband/wife suggests that males take the lead 
over females.  Older brother/younger brother describes how age and seniority can predict 
who is allowed to become a leader.   
 Leaders demonstrate their authority in a number of ways.  The simplest, is giving 
directives that their followers must obey.  By assigning tasks with clear expectations 
followers are less likely to feel ambiguous about their role in the organization.  A leader’s 
authority stems from their centralized decision making.  They have the right to make 
decisions and expect to have them obeyed.  Questioning their decisions can be viewed as 
a challenge to their authority, and conversely, a leader asking for the opinions of his 
followers can be potentially judged as weak.  The third manner in which authority is 
demonstrated in Confucian culture is by having a large power distance between the leader 
and their followers.  This distance can be seen materialistically such as a larger office, 
bigger salary, and in speech by addressing superiors with their title followed by their last 
name.  These demonstrations of authority create a strong hierarchy, but have the negative 
impact of limiting the perceived freedom of followers to provide feedback to decision 
makers.   
 The practice of taking actions to “save face” between leaders and followers is an 
important tenet of Confucian beliefs based on their views of filial piety.  Subordinates 
ingratiate themselves with their leaders by providing them with compliments, gifts, and 
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conforming to their opinions and behavior.  Leaders save their follower’s face by not 
critiquing them publicly and by using indirect language.  They also prefer to use a system 
of positive rewards rather than punishments to enhance performance.  These social 
beliefs are used in order to keep a harmonious leader/follower relationship in an 
organization18.              
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5. Results 
 The United States and China have never come as close to an exchange of nuclear 
weapons as the United States and Soviet Union did during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  This 
experience allowed us to form some perceptions about the Soviet Union that we have 
been able to base our Cold War policies on.  While it may be possible to overlay some of 
the Soviet decision making processes as hypothetical PRC decisions, its imperative to 
keep in consideration the differences between the modern situation and 1962. 
 The highest levels of National Command Authority (NCA) are similar between 
USSR and the PRC.  Both are headed by the position of the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party.  The person holding this position is then simultaneously the head of 
the executive decision making body for national defense, making the Soviet Defense 
Council analogous to the Chinese Central Military Commission.  The purpose of these 
groups is to advise the Chairman on matters concerning national security, provide a clear 
line of communication for disseminating directives from the NCA to military 
commanders, and to ensure that strong civilian control is maintained over the military 
leadership.  In both groups, the Chairman has the ultimate decision making power and 
dictates the use of strategic weapons.  Both nations have established military command 
structures outside of those for their conventional forces to maintain direct control over 
nuclear weapons.  In the Soviet Union this was the Strategic Rocket Forces, and is the 
Second Artillery for China.   
 Khrushchev and the Soviet Defense Council’s reaction to the events of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis may be similar to that of a Chinese President and the CMC in a crisis.  
Khrushchev had little in the way of a formal education, but was highly respected by his 
peers for his political savvy and his many years of experience.  It is likely that any 
Chinese President would be at least middle aged, and have spent most of his adult life as 
a member of the Communist Party, much like the current President, Hu Jintao.  Both the 
Soviets and the Chinese place an importance on seniority.  Age played a factor in 
Khrushchev’s ability to relate to Kennedy, and could be a factor in relations between the 
United States and China in the future, as there is almost a twenty year age gap between 
Barack Obama and Hu Jintao.   
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 The Soviets’ reaction to events such as the American blockade of Cuba and the 
control of nuclear weapons on the island would likely mirror Chinese reactions.  
Khrushchev had a number of advisors from diverse specialties with him for the duration 
of the missile crisis.  All public responses by the Soviets were approved by senior 
leadership including Khrushchev.  It was in private that Khrushchev showed that he had 
the power to communicate with the Kennedy Administration beyond the control of the 
bureaucracy.  The letter sent on 26 October was likely dictated by Khrushchev himself, 
without vetting by officials.  Khrushchev wanted to ensure the security of the Cuban’s by 
having his missiles on their island, but on the other hand he did not want to provoke the 
United States into invading the island.  He likely felt that the situation was deteriorating 
so quickly that he needed to bypass the usual diplomatic process, and make an 
independent and more personal gesture.  A Chinese President would most likely have 
similar authority.   
 The control of the nuclear weapons in Cuba never left the control of the Soviet 
Defense Council.  The Soviet commanders on the island had explicit orders that under no 
condition were the MRBMs or IRBMs to be used without permission of the Council.  
They did have permission to use tactical nuclear weapons in order to stop an invasion of 
Cuba.  Chinese nuclear controls would most likely be the same.  Strategic weapons would 
be kept under the direct control of the CMC at all times under all conditions, with tactical 
weapons at the discretion of the local commander if certain conditions are met.  These 
conditions may include the destruction of the tactical weapons or imminent invasion. 
 What differs is the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
to China and the United States.  The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred seventeen years into 
the Cold War, and relations between the two super powers were tenuous at the best of 
times.  There was little communications between them outside of diplomatic channels, 
and almost no trade was taking place.  China in comparison is one of America’s most 
valuable trading partners, and thousands of Chinese students come to the United States to 
study each year.  While the United States and China won’t be entering a full military 
alliance anytime in the foreseeable future, our respective leaders are not calling for the 
other’s destruction.   
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 The technology of today as compared to what was used in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis has improved to such a degree, that it’s possible that the tension from a modern 
U.S./China crisis would not reach as high a state.  There was no direct means of 
communication between Khrushchev and Kennedy.  The closest they had to it were 
speeches made over the radio, or messages sent via teletype through their embassies.  
Both of these methods required a considerable amount of time to prepare, and in the case 
of the teletype the message had to be encrypted before it was sent, and decrypted when it 
was received, which was lengthy process at the time.  Today the American and Chinese 
Presidents and their staffs have access to near instantaneous telecommunication systems, 
from video conferencing to the simple telephone.     
 When making a comparison between actions of the Soviets and the potential 
actions of the PRC in a modern day situation, we can model this around a crisis involving 
Taiwan, and the ongoing issue of its sovereignty.  Taiwan is a small island nation off the 
shore of China.  China considers Taiwan to be within its sphere of influence, much like 
how the United States viewed Cuba in the 1960s.  Comparatively, China would fill the 
roll of the United States, the powerful nation attempting to control events over its smaller 
neighbor.  The United States would be the Soviet Union, the distant super power that has 
seemingly invaded the other’s back yard.  Taiwan is not integral to the defense of the 
United States just as Cuba wasn’t integral to the Soviets.  If something were to happen to 
either of the island nations, their supporting superpower would not be directly harmed.  
It’s through defense treaties that these partnerships between the Soviet Union and Cuba, 
and the United States and Taiwan were forged.  
 The differences in this scenario can be found in a comparison of the relationships 
between Cuba and the United States and that of China and Taiwan.  Cuba was a foreign 
nation, ideologically opposed to the United States, and was labeled as our enemy.  
Taiwan is not considered a foreign nation by the PRC; they consider Taiwan to be a 
renegade province.  To them, it is a vital interest, directly connected to state survival.  
Chinese leaders have made it clear through their One-China policies with other nations, 
and their portrayal of Taiwan to the Chinese people, that unification is their ultimate goal.  
If Taiwan were to formally declare its independence, China would have to react with 
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force.  If the Chinese government failed to act to prevent Taiwanese independence, they 
would risk large scale rioting by the Chinese people who felt betrayed by it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 46
6. Discussion 
 Like the Soviet Union did in the past, the PRC is actively courting other nations 
and geographic regions; however, China’s expansion is motivated less by the ideological 
ideals of international communism, and more by the needs to acquire trade relations.  
China needs new sources of raw materials and energy to fuel its economic expansion, as 
well as growing markets to satisfy its exports based economy.  China is also attempting to 
expand its territorial borders, and in the case of the South China Sea region it’s to ensure 
lucrative undersea energy resources.  In order to protect these local assets, the PRC is 
taking steps to increase its power projection by constructing a number of conventional 
aircraft carriers  
6.1 China’s Geopolitical Expansion  
 The developing world has been seeing a growth in the amount of attention it has 
received from politically and economically.  Two regions that have witnessed this growth 
are Africa and South America.  The Soviet Union’s partnerships in these locations were 
made primarily for military aid to fend off what they viewed as Western imperialism.   
Many nations that once were allied with the Soviet Union are now looking to China for 
trade and investment to fuel their development more so than military aid.  This may 
change in the future as it becomes more in China’s interest to promote stability in its 
partner nations; in order to ensure that its sources of energy and raw materials are secure.   
6.1.1 China’s Expansion into Africa 
 In October 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was formally 
established, providing a new platform of multilateral dialogue and cooperation.  The 
mechanism is playing important roles in promoting Sino-African economic cooperation, 
expanding cooperation areas, deepening cooperation levels, and innovating cooperation 
forms.  Meanwhile, the China-Africa Business Conference, China-Africa Joint Chamber 
of Commerce, and China-Africa Business Council are also important organizations 
boosting bilateral economic and trade cooperation20. 
 With the gradual increase of the economic strength of China and Africa, the forms 
of bilateral cooperation between the two are constantly upgraded from commodity trade 
and economic assistance, to direct investment, labor service and project contracting, then 
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to the establishment of economic cooperation areas.  In 2007, the China-Africa 
Development Fund was established in Beijing, starting a new form of Sino-African 
cooperation.  Currently, the bilateral cooperation covers many fields such as trade, 
production and processing, resource exploration, transportation, communications and 
other infrastructures, agriculture and agricultural product comprehensive processing, and 
disease prevention and control. 
 In terms of China, its cooperation with African countries can ensure a 
marketplace and a supply of the raw materials needed for its sustained economic 
development.  China exports mechanical and electrical products, construction materials, 
textiles, and other light industrial products to Africa, providing business opportunities for 
related Chinese enterprises.  During its cooperation process with African nations, China 
attaches no conditions, and does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs.  The 
practice is warmly applauded by African countries and has attracted attention from the 
international community, further increasing China's influence in the world21. 
 By cooperating with China, African countries can share China's development 
experience and obtain the opportunities brought by China’s rapid economic growth.  The 
high-quality but low-price “made-in-China” products greatly benefit Africans.  China’s 
investment also helps African countries reduce the costs of project construction, and 
increases employment opportunities.  Cooperation also promotes the diversity in Africa’s 
investment industry, which can also reform its single product-based economic structure 
and promote sustainable development in Africa. 
 More importantly, Sino-African economic cooperation not only plays the 
demonstrative role of South-South cooperation among developing countries, but also 
drives the world community to attach more importance to the continent.  Owing to the 
rapid development between China and Africa, some world powers such as the United 
States and Japan have also strengthened their cooperation mechanisms with Africa in 
succession, thereby increasing their attention and investments in Africa, and improving 
the external environment for Africa’s development. 
 Chinese President Hu Jintao’s decision to visit non-resource rich countries during 
his week-long tour in Africa in February 2009 was intended to signal a new phase in 
Sino-African relations, in the view of press commentators in both Africa and China. 
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While a Chinese commentator suggested that the choice of Mali, Senegal, Mauritius and 
Tanzania showed China did not simply focus its relationship with the continent on the 
acquisition of raw materials, in Africa pundits considered explanations grounded in the 
country’s political interests.  In Senegal’s Wal Fadjri on 14 February, journalist and 
researcher Adama Gaye said China was paying more attention to Africa not only because 
of its need for natural resources, but because it counted on the continent for diplomatic 
support in its drive for reintegrating Taiwan to the mainland.  In view of this, “it’s up to 
Africans to insist that China doesn’t just take the raw materials... but that some value is 
added,” he said.  Gaye suggested Africans should insist on the Chinese being less 
“haughty” in their dealings with them, and said that the fact that the president had chosen 
to visit non-resource rich countries was “a step in the right direction.” 
 The People’s Liberation Army – Navy, sent a task force of four vessels to the 
waters off the Horn of Africa to assist in the international anti-piracy efforts.  In a news 
conference, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense stated that the PLA Navy had been 
sent to “offer security safeguards for Chinese vessels and personnel” sailing near Somali 
waters.  An official from the Ministry of Communications explained that the PLA Navy 
vessels will also escort Taiwanese ships and foreign vessels carrying Chinese goods, and 
may also assist vessels transporting humanitarian goods21. He added, however, that 
requests for assistance by foreign vessels without “Chinese investments” will be 
considered “depending on the circumstances22.”  
 A Foreign Ministry spokesman on 23 December 2008 said that China's Navy 
would safeguard “world peace and stability,” and emphasized that China adheres to 
“peaceful development,” and practices a “non-aggressive defense policy,” according to 
China’s official news agency Xinhua.  A Foreign Ministry spokesman on 18 December 
stressed that action to combat piracy was “authorized” under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and that China “supports efforts by relevant countries” to combat piracy “under 
international law” and “UN Security Council resolutions23.” 
6.1.2 China’s Expansion into Latin America 
 Sino-Latin American trade relations, as noted in a 6 November editorial in Ta 
Kung Pao, have “important strategic significance” for China’s economic development.   
From Latin America, China can obtain a “steady” and “large” supply of the resources it 
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needs to alleviate the “bottleneck” obstructing its development.   The editorial referred to 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile as the “most important” countries in South America, and 
noted that they have “rich natural resources of all kinds.”   Underscoring the importance 
of trade ties, the editorial declared that Hu’s visits to these three countries was “even 
more significant” than his visit to Cuba, China’s “old friend24.”    
 Included among the agreements signed during Hu’s November visits were a 
memorandum of understanding on the joint exploitation of Chile’s copper resources and a 
10-year investment and cooperation agreement worth $19 billion with Argentina; $8 
billion of which will be used for railway projects.  Independent Hong Kong media also 
reported that an agreement was signed for US$500 million Chinese investment in a new 
nickel plant in Cuba.  PRC media reports suggest that a major driver of China’s efforts to 
improve ties with the region is to expand trade with Latin America and secure new export 
markets for Chinese products25.  
 Cuba’s efforts to cultivate ties to China may spring in part from a move to lessen 
reliance on Venezuela, its top trading partner.  Its relative coolness to Medvedev suggests 
it is may seek to maintain more limited ties with Russia, possibly to avoid a repeat of its 
earlier reliance on Soviet aid and resentment over the abrupt end of aid following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  Cuba also may be keeping some distance from Russia’s 
recent more confrontational line toward the United States as Havana anticipates a 
potential change in US policy toward Cuba, under the Obama administration.  Castro 
praised the “optimal results” of Hu’s visit, which included the signing of two accords 
restructuring Cuban debt; the establishment of a $70 million credit line and an $8 million 
grant.  Castro said Medvedev’s visit had been “wonderful,” but made no comment on its 
outcome26. 
 Chinese news agency Xinhua quoted President Chavez of Venezuela as saying 
that the package of energy cooperation agreements reached during his December 2004 
visit included permission for Chinese companies to explore for oil and natural gas in 
Venezuela.   Chavez also indicated that Venezuela “welcomed” China to “join hands” on 
the construction of an oil pipeline.  He also highlighted plans to sell up to 500,000 b/d of 
oil to China by 2009, and 1 million b/d by 2012 via a joint tanker fleet venture, and to 
build new refineries in Venezuela and China.  Chavez said this would “in no way” affect 
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oil sales to other countries.  Three members of the Politburo Standing Committee, 
China’s highest ruling body --President Hu Jintao, National People's Congress Chairman 
Wu Bangguo, and Vice Premier Li Keqiang -- met with Chavez during his visit, the same 
number in 2006.  In contrast, four members of the Politburo Standing Committee met 
with Chavez during his December 2004 visit, which likely means that they see his 
importance to China as increasing.   
 During his 24 September 2008 meeting with Chavez, Hu said that China was 
ready to “deepen cooperation with Venezuela in the upstream-downstream integration of 
the petroleum industry,” and emphasized the importance of continued joint investment.  
He made similar statements during Chavez’s 2006 visit when he welcomed “Venezuelan 
enterprises to open up the market in China.”  PRC media reporting indicates that the 
Chinese Government seeks to avoid disrupting its more strategically important 
relationship with the United States, as it expands economic ties with Venezuela.  A PRC 
Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on 16 September 2008 that China-Venezuela 
cooperation “does not target any third party,” and that energy cooperation between the 
two “will not affect Venezuela’s oil supplies to other countries.”  A scholar in a State 
Council think tank told a provincial Communist Party publication that China does not 
have “adequate refineries” to handle Venezuela’s heavy oil, whereas “the United States is 
equipped with quite developed refineries.”  He also noted that “importing large amounts 
of oil from Venezuela will incur high costs.”  Another scholar in a Ministry of State 
Security-approved think tank stated that the amount of oil imported from Venezuela is 
“insignificant in comparison with Venezuela’s supply of 50% of its oil to the United 
States27.” 
6.2 China’s Economic Expansion 
 Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has continuously stepped up its 
development, has further improved its overall national strength, and has attracted the 
attention of the international community in regard to its development trend as well as its 
new international strategy.  The UK journal, The Economist, said that 2008 was the “Year 
of China,” not only referring to China’s first time hosting of the Olympic Games, but also 
referring to the substantial elevation of China's economic strength.  In 2007, China's GDP 
based on an “initial calculation” soared to RMB 24.6619 trillion.  Later, China’s State 
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Statistic Bureau revised the GDP data, according to which China's GDP growth rate for 
2007 increased from 11.4 percent to 11.9 percent.  According to the dollar-RMB 
exchange rate of 7.3046 to 1 at the end of 2007, China’s GDP was up nearly 14 times the 
figure of 1979, and more or less the same as that of Germany.  China’s per capita GDP in 
2007 was roughly $2,500, nearly a 20-fold increase from 1979.  China’s total foreign 
trade volume was $2.1738 trillion, ranking third in the world, roughly a 100-fold growth 
from 1979.  China’s foreign exchange reserves hit $1.5282 trillion, ranking first in the 
world.  As for China’s output of major industrial products in 2007, the output of coal was 
2.536 billion tons, crude steel was 490 million tons, the 10 nonferrous metals were 23.51 
million tons, and cement was 1.354 billion tons, all showing comparatively great 
increases from 1979.  In addition, China jumped to rank first in gross output of an 
increasing number of indicative products in 2007.  For instance, China’s gross grain 
yields exceeded 500 million tons, large-capacity harbors handled more than 5 billion 
tons, there were more than 300 million fixed-line telephone users and more than 500 
million mobile phone users in China, and China’s on-campus college students numbered 
18.85 million.  China ranked first in all these fields28.  
 At the same time, recent media reporting also suggests that China is seeking to 
downplay expectations of its role in contributing to international rescue funds or direct 
investment abroad.  China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman avoided directly responding to 
a question about China’s willingness to increase investment in the IMF, saying that China 
will continue to play a role “within its ability.”  He reiterated that China is willing to 
“enhance cooperation” with world financial organizations “including the IMF,” according 
to Xinhua.  A 7 November 2008 commentary in Zhongguo Tongxun She, a Hong Kong-
based, PRC-owned press agency, asserted that China will “not act as the world's savior” 
at the G20 meeting, but will “take a cautious stance” and “actively encourage 
international cooperation.”  Hinting that China is reluctant to deploy its foreign reserves 
abroad, China’s official English-language newspaper China Daily quoted Li Rongrong -- 
head of China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) -- warning state-owned firms to “hold onto your cash” and not “rush into” 
overseas acquisitions. 
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 China’s foreign reserves totaled US$1.95 trillion (S$2.95 trillion) at the end of 
2008.  If other foreign assets held by the central bank, the commercial banks, and the 
China Investment Corporation (CIC) are included, total foreign reserves stood at US$2.1 
trillion - the largest in the world, double the size of Japan’s and four times that of 
Russia’s.  “This could be the largest single store of liquid wealth available on earth,” said 
Mr. Martin Walker, senior director of the Global Business Policy Council, a private 
think-tank founded by the A. T. Kearney business consultancy.  According to a study by 
the US Council on Foreign Relations, 72 percent of China’s reserves are held in US 
dollar-denominated assets, making China the United States’ single largest creditor.  It 
estimated that in the last four quarters of 2008, when the U.S. financial meltdown was 
taking a heavy toll, China had lent roughly US$40 billion a month to the United States, 
and contributed a lot to easing the latter's credit crunch.  Mr. Brad Setser, the study’s 
author, remarked: “Never before has a relatively poor country lent out so much money to 
a relatively rich country. And never before has the United States relied on a single 
country’s government for so much financing.”  He estimated that as of the end of last 
year, the Chinese portfolio included roughly US$900 billion in treasury bonds, US$600 
billion in agency bonds (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae), US$150 billion in 
corporate bonds, US$40 billion in US equities and another US$40 billion in short-term 
deposits28.  
 However, there are risks if China were to use its foreign currency reserves.  
Foremost is the specter of inflation.  Until now, the impact of these huge reserves on the 
domestic Chinese money supply was somewhat neutralized by retaining them as foreign 
currency assets.  If the funds were to be ploughed back into the domestic economy, the 
money supply would increase and prices would likely rise.  Then there is the problem of 
maintaining exchange rate stability. Unloading sizeable foreign reserves could lead to a 
corresponding rise in the Yuan exchange rate, which could put many of the export 
manufacturers at risk, since many operate on razor-thin profit margins29.  
6.3 China’s Military and Influence Expansion  
 China’s impressive economic growth has been fueling a surge in spending for 
military modernization on all levels.  This includes their communications, command, 
control, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance or C4ISR technology, 
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naval assets, and strategic weaponry.  This spending on military hardware with 
capabilities beyond the needs for internal security and local defense may indicate that the 
Chinese leadership acknowledges its need for advanced systems if it were in a dispute 
with the United States.  These new assets, which include air craft carriers, will enable the 
land power that China currently is to project its power far beyond its own borders.  The 
reason why China would risk appearing confrontational to the United States would be if 
the Chinese leadership viewed another threat as being greater.  This greater threat is a 
national, urban, or rural uprising by the Chinese people themselves from dissatisfaction 
with their leadership’s management of the state.  The most likely trigger for an uprising 
would be from a collapse in the national economy, which necessitates the need for its 
defense of energy and resources.  In order to maintain the harmony and unity of the 
nation, China is very willing to change the balance of military power in the world.          
 In the course of building a modern military, China continues to skip doing certain 
things in the process of mechanization (i.e. enhancing hardware and acquiring more 
advanced operational platforms) while it strives to achieve leapfrog development in key 
areas.  Thereby, it adopts a policy of composite development of mechanization and 
informationization (i.e. digitalization of weaponry).  The PLA is also transforming a 
strategy from winning a local war with the condition of high-technology, to winning a 
war under the condition of informationization.  By 2020, the PLA will accomplish the 
goal of mechanization, and make major progress in informationization.  From 2006 to 
2008, the PLA’s defense expenditure grew even more significantly.  The defense 
expenditure was 297.938 billion Yuan (about US$38 billion) in 2006 and 355.491 billion 
Yuan (about $45 billion) in 2007, up 20.4% and 19.3% respectively over the previous 
year.  If viewed over a longer time span, Chinese defense spending has risen sharply - 
from about 16.7 billion Yuan ($2.4 billion) in 1978 to about 417.7 billion Yuan (about 
$60 billion) in fiscal year 2008, roughly a 25-fold increase28. 
 In the spring of 2008, Pew Research conducted a survey of 24,717 people from 24 
countries.  This survey shows that people who believe that China “has already” or “will” 
replace the United States as the “world superpower” account for 66 percent, 61 percent, 
58 percent, 57 percent, 55 percent and 51 percent of interviewees in France, Germany, 
Australia, Spain, the UK and South Korea.  The percentage results for the United States 
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were 36 percent.   This survey showed to a certain extent that it is widely believed that 
China will surpass the United States “sometime,” and become the number one economic 
superpower in the world.  This survey further proved that the elevation of China’s overall 
national strength has already become an international consensus31.  
 From China's perspective, the world “hegemonic power” is the world “head goat,” 
which is not an admirable role.  The current predicament facing the United States 
includes wide-ranging problems.  In the field of security, the United States is facing 
antiterrorism, the Iraq War, the Afghanistan War, the North Korean nuclear crisis, the 
Iran nuclear crisis, the South Ossetia clash, political uncertainties in Pakistan and 
Thailand, and turbulence in Sudan.  In terms of economy, the United States is facing the 
subprime crisis, the global economic downturn, sharp fluctuations of energy prices, 
money laundering and the deadlock of the Doha Round.  In terms of strategies, the 
United States is facing the revitalization of Russia, the rise of large bourgeoning 
countries, the challenge from “rogue” countries, the rise of anti-Americanism, and 
adjustment of Atlantic relations.  China is seeing all of this, and has kept it firmly in 
mind.  The Chinese view the predicament facing the United States as a genuine picture of 
the reverse investment-to-return ratio facing the hegemonic country in the 21st century, 
and interpret it as proof of China’s wisdom and transcendence characterized by refusing 
to exercise hegemony.  
 To this extent, Mao Zedong proposed the “noose theory,” prescribing not to 
exercise hegemony.  Deng Xiaoping proposed “absolutely not to take the lead.”  Hu 
Jintao continued to advocate not exercising hegemony.  This is not only a matter of 
diplomatic ethic and strategic tradition, but is also -- more importantly -- a strategic 
conclusion drawn by China’s community of strategists on the basis of a comprehensive 
analyses of the national interests.  Therefore, this belief is built on a profound strategic 
cultural foundation and the foundation, for realizing national interests, which permeate 
China's diplomacy.   
 China has benefited a lot from “blending itself with” the current international 
system.  This however, does not mean that China is completely complacent with the 
current international order32.  For instance, China is extremely opposed to the West on the 
following events: 1) practicing “values diplomacy” and “human rights diplomacy”, 2) 
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exporting “democracy” to non-Western countries, 3) exercising “color revolutions” and 
“regime reconstruction,” 4) grading non-Western countries according to a Western 
standard, 5) interfering with the internal affairs of developing countries, and even 6) 
launching preemptive strikes.  Therefore, while China actively “blends with” the world, 
China also proposes to gradually reforming what it views as unreasonable points of the 
international order.  While cooperating with the United States and the West in general, 
China refuses to “follow suit” without careful thinking.  China also struggles against 
hegemony in an appropriate manner and on a justifiable, beneficial and restrictive basis.  
 To sum up, in terms of the rise of China, it desires to realize its rise through 
strengthening international stability and actively accelerating the gradual and reasonable 
reform of the international order while "blending with" the world.  Second, China desires 
to realize this through maintaining world peace, and by maintaining cooperative relations 
with the dominating country, i.e. the United States.  China will also persist with a 
reasonable struggle against the United States and the West's hegemonic policies in a bid 
to curb their hegemony.  Third, China will rise through persisting in refusing to exercise 
and plan hegemony.  However, China will adhere to its principles of justice, maintain 
international equality and justice, step up parallel prosperity and development, and regard 
this as the fundamental approach for realizing fundamental national interests.  These 
points are the concept of a “harmonious world,” as advocated by China.  This 
“harmonious world” and the steps China wants to take to create it are crafted along 
Chinese ideals; its justice does not mean the same as justice.   
6.3.1 China’s Pursuit of Carriers 
 Having gained confidence in their ability to menace U.S. aircraft carriers, 
People’s Liberation Army - Navy (PLAN) strategists understand that Chinese carriers 
would likewise be vulnerable in a fleet engagement.  Rather than expose its flattops to a 
US counterattack, Beijing likely has other purposes in mind for them.  “China has a long 
coastline and the sacred duty of China’s armed forces is to safeguard the country's marine 
safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas.33”  While this sounds 
harmless enough, Beijing asserts jurisdiction over virtually the entire South China Sea.  
Putting steel behind maritime territorial claims disputed by fellow Asian states only 
makes sense from China’s standpoint.  Aircraft carriers from the PLAN’s new base on 
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Hainan would serve to put an exclamation point on Beijing’s claims vis-a-vis rival 
claimants like Vietnam and the Philippines.  Second, economic logic is refocusing 
Beijing’s strategic gaze on waters even farther afield than Southeast Asia.  China’s 
current leadership has staked its legitimacy on improving the nation’s standard of living 
and that means securing reliable seaborne shipments of oil, gas and other raw materials.  
A carrier fleet would give Beijing some control over the sea lanes that crisscross the 
Indian Ocean, bringing vital resources to Chinese users.  Third, aircraft carriers are a 
powerful symbol of a nation’s strength.  Reversing China's “century of humiliation” at 
the hands of Western sea powers is a top priority for Beijing, which has noticed it’s the 
only permanent member of the UN Security Council without carriers in its naval 
inventory.  India has one carrier with plans for more, and even the Royal Thai Navy 
sports one34. 
 China believes it can rebrand itself as a great seafaring nation by procuring 
carriers.  As time has passed by, the embryo of the design for China to build aircraft 
carriers by itself was gradually formed.  According to one source, the size of the deck of 
the aircraft carrier that China plans to build will be 320 meters×70 meters, its standard 
displacement will be 60,000 tons and its full load displacement will be 80,000 tons. 
Proportionally it will be close to Russia's Ulyanovsk aircraft carrier, but a little smaller 
than the USS Kitty Hawk.  Its appearance will be similar to the USS Kitty Hawk, while 
its internal structure will be based on the "Ulyanovsk" aircraft carrier35.  
 China’s conventionally powered aircraft carriers are codenamed the 085 project, 
while the nuclear powered carriers are codenamed the 089 project.  Both purportedly 
come from the same drawing.  The 085 and the 089 aircraft carriers share the same 
appearance and size, except for their internal power.  The 085 project involves two 
aircraft carriers that are planned to be completed by 2020, and will be deployed in the 
East China and the South China Seas.  As for the question regarding when the 089 project 
will be launched, it will depend on China's economic strength after 2020.  In 2009, the 
aircraft carrier program will gradually ramp up, and sometime between 2015 and 2017, 
China will have its first aircraft carrier, which may be named “Beijing” or “Shanghai36”. 
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6.4 China’s Territorial Disputes 
 China’s borders cover vast distances and cross some of the most inhospitable 
terrain on earth, such as the Himalayas, to rocky island chains dotting the South China 
Sea.  Due to the history China had with colonial powers carving up swathes of Chinese 
territory as their own, their leadership has fostered a highly defensive, or “never again” 
attitude towards defending what they view as Chinese sovereign territory.  While China is 
willing to negotiate with the nations in these disputes, they are unlikely to agree to any 
deal that may be seen as backing down by the populace.  The best example of this would 
be the island of Taiwan, considered a renegade province by mainland China.  If the 
Chinese leadership were to allow them to declare formal independence then they would 
be viewed as weak and caving in to foreign pressures.  The need for China to keep face 
domestically could result in possible entanglements with the United States.  If nations 
that have a territorial claim against China and are defense partners with the United States, 
such as the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan, and attempted to force China to accept their 
claims, then escalation could occur quickly. 
6.4.1 China’s Territorial Dispute with the Philippines   
 The Philippine government has watered down its claims to the disputed Spratly 
Islands in the face of diplomatic pressure from China, which also claims the islands. 
Lawmakers from both chambers of the Philippine Congress agreed to adopt legislation 
which does not describe the islands as lying within the so-called archipelagic baseline of 
Philippine territory.  The South China Sea atolls were instead claimed as “a regime of 
islands under the Republic of the Philippines”.  While the definition does not represent 
the abandonment of Philippine claims to the islands, it is a substantial retreat from a 
controversial description of the Spratlys approved by the Philippine House of 
Representatives, which had prompted a swift response from Beijing.  The definition, 
contained in the so-called “baseline bill” defining Philippine territory, said that the 
“Kalayaan Island Group” - which comprise 53 of the Spratly Islands - and the 
Scarborough Shoal, were both within the Philippines archipelago.  China refers to 
Scarborough Shoal as the Huangyan Islands, and the Spratlys as the Nansha Islands38. 
 “China has undisputable sovereign rights over the Huangyan Islands, Nansha 
Islands and their adjacent waters,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiang Yu said.  She 
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expressed the hope that the Philippines would “refrain from taking actions that may 
complicate and increase disputes”.  Beijing’s response prompted Philippine Senate 
President Juan Ponce Enrile to call for the final bill to adopt a “more realistic approach to 
the problem”, since Manila lacked “battleships and squadrons”.  The baseline bill has 
long been a sore point of relations between Manila and Beijing.  In December 2007, the 
Philippine House foreign relations committee initially approved inclusion of the Spratlys 
within the Philippine baseline.  China then sent a memo to the Philippine embassy in 
Beijing saying: “China is shocked by and gravely concerned with this negative 
development.”  “If the Philippine side forcefully puts Scarborough Shoal and some other 
Nansha reefs and islands inside the baseline of Philippine territorial sea, it will... disturb 
China-Philippine co-operation in the area, exerting negative impact on the healthy 
development of our bilateral relations.” 
 The tone of the response prompted Congress to shelve the baseline bill for two 
years.  Congressman Roilo Golez, who attended Monday's bicameral committee meeting, 
said lawmakers respected China's stand.  “It's their prerogative,” he said, “I think we are 
both very civil.  This is something we can discuss... among civilized nations.”  Senator 
Enrile, who drafted the final version of the bill that is now destined for approval by both 
houses, insisted that the new text did not undermine the Philippines’ claim to the 
Spratlys.  He said the text would state explicitly that the islands were considered part of 
the Philippine province of Palawan.  It would also reiterate the nation’s historical claim to 
Scarborough Shoal, traditionally known as Bajo de Masinloc.  The presidential palace 
said it backed the new wording.  The new impetus for enacting the baseline bill has been 
prompted by a May 13 deadline under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, requiring Manila to define the basis for its claim to territory on the extended 
continental shelf38. 
 The Spratlys consist of about 180 barren islets, reefs, and atolls; dotting the 
world’s busiest shipping lanes in the South China Sea.  Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei each claim all or part of the low-lying islands, believed 
to be rich in oil, gas and fishery resources.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
issued a statement Wednesday reiterating the Republic of China’s historical claim to 
islands and reefs in the South China Sea, including the Spratlys.  The MOFA statement 
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came after the two chambers of the Philippine legislature -- the Senate and House of 
Representatives -- passed bills, to annex some isles and reefs of the Spratly Islands (better 
known as Nansha in Chinese) and Macclesfield Bank Islands (known locally as 
Jhongsha) as part of the Philippines’ territory.  The MOFA stated that Taiwan’s 
sovereignty claim is beyond doubt and challenge, stressing that all four groups of islands 
in the South China Sea -- Nansha, Jhongsha, Dongsha (Pratas) Islands and Sisha 
(Paracel) Islands -- and their surrounding waters are Taiwan’s territories from a 
historical, geographical, factual, and international law perspective.  Moreover, the MOFA 
called on the Philippines to negotiate with Taiwan on the South China Sea sovereignty 
dispute under the principles and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, the U.N. 
convention on the Law of Sea and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea to resolve the conflicting claims peacefully39.  
6.4.2 China’s Territorial Dispute with Vietnam 
 Negotiating teams from Vietnam and China recently announced a final agreement 
for demarcating the two countries’ long-contested 1,350-kilometer land border.  While 
the deal seemed to have resolved one simmering dispute between the nations, it has 
deepened rifts between the Vietnamese communist leadership and some in its military 
over how best to deal with their larger northern neighbor. 
 The dilemma for Vietnam’s communists is how to preserve the party’s control, 
but not cede the country's sovereignty.  To maintain Beijing's ideological support, Hanoi 
consistently tries to appease its northern patron, but China seldom makes it easy.  There 
are currently four other major territorial disputes between Vietnam and China, which in 
turn will affect Vietnam's domestic politics in the years ahead.   
 First is the Gulf of Tonkin, which was formally demarcated in a 2000 treaty, 
although an official map still has not been published.  There have been numerous 
incidents in recent years of Chinese naval vessels firing on Vietnamese fishing boats in 
the maritime area, and in some cases leading to a serious loss of life.  Although these 
fishermen ventured into waters which had sustained them for generations, the Vietnamese 
government must have either conceded the fishing grounds or the Chinese navy invaded 
Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.  Whatever the reason, the sinking of Vietnamese 
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fishing boats by Chinese warships has gone largely unreported in the official Vietnamese 
media but has been widely discussed on private blogs.  
 Second are the Paracel Islands which China seized from Vietnam on January 19, 
1974.  The Hanoi government still claims these islands, but intentionally keeps most of 
the population in the dark as to who really occupies them.  The reason is that the Paracel 
Islands had been held by South Vietnam during the war, and communist North Vietnam 
implicitly supported the invasion of the archipelago by its communist China allies.   
 Third are the Spratly Islands, which are claimed in full by Vietnam, China and 
Taiwan, and in part by other Southeast Asian countries.  In late 2007, China went a step 
further in formally annexing the Spratlys and the Paracels.  While the Hanoi government 
publicly protested China's move, it also cracked down on Vietnamese students and 
bloggers who demonstrated against China.  
 Fourth is the Nam Con Son basin, an oil and gas-rich area off the coast of 
southern Vietnam and well within the country’s legal exclusive economic zone.  Last 
year, China pressured ExxonMobil to withdraw from an energy concession in the area 
granted by Vietnam40.   
6.4.3 China’s Territorial Dispute with Taiwan 
 Unlike the strategically located Spratly Islands, which are contested by six 
claimants, the Pratas archipelago - which lies near Taiwan and China - is claimed 
primarily by the two sides, but Beijing has not specifically challenged Taipei's ownership 
of the island chain.  “That is because China already regards Taiwan - including what the 
latter stakes claim on - as part of its territory,” said Associate Professor Chiang Huang-
chih, international law expert at the National Taiwan University.  The mainland has 
sought to cooperate with Taiwan in the South China Sea because it does not want Taipei 
to become “one of the multilateral parties” competing for claims to disputed islands, said 
Professor Lin Cheng-yi of the Academia Sinica, a top Taiwanese research institute.  In 
2003, government-run oil refineries of both sides even formed a company to jointly 
conduct oil and natural gas exploration in waters near Pratas, said reports.  The first well 
was drilled in 2005 but no oil was discovered41.  
 A recent cross-strait agreement to resume oil exploration in the Taiwan Strait 
could possibly include waters near Pratas, say some analysts.  Even though Taiwan's 
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claim to Pratas was not vigorously contested, it began in 1956 to station marine fighters 
on the islet because of its strategic importance.  The archipelago straddles an important 
sea route at the north of the South China Sea linking the Pacific and Indian oceans.  
In 2000, Taiwan replaced the marines with coast guards, in what the then-government 
cited as a move to help reduce tensions in the South China Sea.  
 “Under Taiwan's defense laws, coast guards were not considered armed forces. 
Hence, clashes would not escalate immediately into an armed conflict,” said retired 
Taiwanese navy captain Lee Jiann-ching, who teaches at the National Defense 
University.  But others argued that the real reason was that modern military technology 
had rendered the islet indefensible by Taiwan.  The Chinese military had reportedly 
simulated an invasion of Pratas - which is 260km from the Chinese city of Shantou - as 
part of an all-out offensive against Taiwan.  Today, Pratas is administered by some 200 
coast guards, who are tasked with warding off Chinese fishing boats, instead of repelling 
warships.   
6.4.4 China’s Territorial Dispute with Japan 
 Ever since a large reserve of gas and oil was discovered in the East China Sea in 
1968, the Sino-Japanese dispute over it intensified.  As both countries rely heavily on 
imported energy products, neither of them would easily drop its claim.  The disagreement 
was so severe that it could endanger bilateral ties if not dealt with properly.  The 
authorities from China and Japan have realized it is now time to settle the problem with 
mutual efforts for the disputes might escalate and result in a historic retrogression in their 
ties, and such a possibility would not be welcomed by politicians with foresight and wise 
people in both countries.   
 There are two international laws to be referred to when neighboring countries 
divide marine area; the Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf signed in 1958 and 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  The second convention, to which China 
and Japan are signatories, stipulates that the continental shelf of a coastal state comprises 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.  China has always held that the Okinawa Oceanic Trough, 2,700 
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meters deep, should be regarded as the point that divides the continental shelf with Japan 
because it extends from the Chinese continental shelf.   
 Meanwhile, Japan claims that the East China Sea should be demarcated along a 
“median line” with equal distance to the territories of the two countries.  Since there are 
international precedents for the claims for both countries, neither of them would 
compromise their rights over the marine territory.  Many conflicts have risen from the 
dispute and become a bitter part in the bilateral ties.  From 2004 to 2007, China and 
Japan held 11 rounds of negotiations, trying to settle the territory dispute.  During his 
visit to China in late 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda reached a four-point 
agreement with Primer Wen Jiabao on the East China Sea issue.  After President Hu 
Jintao visited Japan in May for a “warm spring” trip, significant progress was made, 
enough to settle the dispute over the East China Sea.  The latest consensus on the joint 
exploration of the gas field is a sign of substantial progress, which has been applauded by 
both sides. 
 The core of this consensus is that the two countries should put the territory dispute 
aside and cooperate for tapping the rich oil and gas reserve in the East China Sea.  The 
two sides have decided to choose an area of 2,600 square kilometers that is acceptable to 
both, in which joint investment and exploration of the gas reserve will be carried out 
before a demarcation plan is agreed on by the two governments.  In other words, this is 
an economic cooperation having nothing to do with sovereignty, and the legal positions 
of both are not affected.  It is an initiative proposed by China, that the sovereignty dispute 
should be put aside to facilitate the cooperation in exploring and sharing the resources42. 
6.4.5 China’s Territorial Dispute with India 
 In an exclusive interview to CNN-IBN, Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi reiterated 
his country’s claim to the strategically important state and said the border dispute with 
India was complicated and would take time to resolve.  “In our position, the whole of 
what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory and Tawang (district) is 
only one place in it and we are claiming all of that -- that's our position,” said 
Ambassador Sun Yuxi.  China cites the Tawang Monastery, one of the last vestiges of 
Mahayana Buddhism, as evidence that the mountainous district of Tawang in Arunachal 
Pradesh once belonged to Tibet, and that India should hand it back to help settle the row.  
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 The dispute over the 3,500-km India-China border led to the 1962 war.  New 
Delhi disputes Beijing's rule over 38,000 sq km of barren, icy and uninhabited land on the 
Tibetan plateau, which China seized from India in the 1962 war.  China, for its part, 
claims 90,000 sq km of territory in Arunachal Pradesh.  Within that disputed area is 
Tawang and its monastery.  The neighbors have held several rounds of talks since 1981 to 
resolve the dispute, but so far have failed to make progress.   
 They did agree on an 11-point roadmap to settle the border row in light of 
booming bilateral trade and growing ties.  The proposal was seen as an attempt towards 
accepting the status quo and hammering out a swap whereby China would give up claims 
in the east, in return for India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty in the strategic Aksai 
Chin area in the west.  Although both sides seemed amenable to such a deal, Beijing’s 
demand for Tawang -- and India's refusal to part with any populated territories -- has 
created a stumbling block44. 
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7. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 China’s nuclear and strategic decision making during crisis will be determined by 
a number of internal and external factors.  The internal factors will revolve around their 
president, since he will have the deciding power in the use of nuclear weapons, the 
president’s closest advisors, and the opinion of the Chinese people.  The strength of the 
relationship between himself and his pro-military action advisors will likely be weighted 
against the strength of the relationship between himself and his non-military action 
advisors.  The influence wielded by these groups is determined prior to the conflict and is 
separate from the group’s stance about the crisis.  While the Chinese government is non-
democratic the opinion of the Chinese people are a deciding factor during a crisis that the 
president must take into account.  The Chinese media is under state control which 
provides them the ability to make their case to the people more strongly than a 
democratic nation could.  This benefit can become a handicap if the momentum of public 
opinion continues beyond the desired point, which would hamper the Chinese 
government’s ability to negotiate for a peaceful resolution while maintaining national 
stability.    
 The external factors that would affect Chinese decision making during a crisis 
would be generated by China’s interaction with other nations.  The type of nation, the 
amount of Chinese interest invested in the nation, if relations are based on an economic 
or defensive basis or both, if territory is at stake, and if face is at stake, are all external 
factors.  The type of nation refers to its military strength, economic strength, political 
power in the global community and proximity to China.  China is more likely to use 
strong-arm tactics against smaller neighbors such as Vietnam than it would more distant 
stronger nations such as the United States.  The relations between the nations involved in 
the crisis with China will have an influence.  The response China would have to the 
United States if it were to take action against Venezuela which supplies oil to China 
would likely be stronger than if the United States took action against Cuba which does 
not provide vital resources.  The global community is of definite interest to China as they 
seek to portray themselves as wanting to act in harmony with it.  Nations that are not 
strong in the international community such as Taiwan are more likely to be bullied by 
China than stronger powers such as India, because there would be potentially less 
 65
outrage.  Nations that neighbor China are much more likely to be in a crisis with China 
because of a territorial dispute, since China is a land and costal power, China can 
leverage the full force of its military against them.  Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan are 
all ways that the United States could become embroiled with a local dispute.   
 Understanding how to deescalate a crisis with China is as important as 
understanding the factors that influence.  The way that the Cuban Missile Crisis was 
deescalated is a prime example of how it should be done.  The respect the Kennedy 
administration afforded the Soviets in acknowledging their threats and demands should 
be afforded to the Chinese.  The ability for both sides to walk away as the winner will be 
integral for success.  A situation where the United States flaunts it dominance and 
prevents the Chinese from being allowed an honorable way to back down from the crisis 
will likely result in escalation.     
 The Cuban Missile Crisis makes for a fair model to understand how the Chinese 
may react to a crisis situation.  Despite the similarities between the Soviet and Chinese 
governments it is unlikely that the red line; the point in which the posturing ends and the 
threat of nuclear war is realized, will be determined until a situation arises that tests it.  
National leaders should not, and most likely will not, base their decisions solely on past 
enemy actions also known as planning for the last war.  Kennedy based his decisions not 
on the Berlin crisis or the Bay of Pigs, but on the information available to him.   
 It simplifies the planning process to think of nations as a singular entity, or “If I 
were China, how would I react to this?”  This is an over simplification which distorts the 
real decision making process.  Strategic decisions are made by National Command 
Authorities, which are made up of individuals.  These individuals are working in the 
interest of their nation, but typically have a number of lesser allegiances to their 
organizations, departments, and or bureaus, within their government.  These sub-groups 
often compete with each other in order to accomplish their agendas, which can have an 
impact on the individual’s decisions and participation within the context of the NCA.  
Since it is widely accepted no two people are exactly alike, no two groups should be 
predisposed to think alike since the group inherits the dynamics of the individuals, 
making it fundamentally impossible to predict with great certainty that one group’s 
decision based on the past decision of a different group for similar circumstances, would 
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arrive at the same decision.  The more detailed the comparison of the people and their 
profiles and roles within the governments, the better the resulting prediction might be.   
 China is advancing on the world stage with a grand strategy entirely different 
from the Soviets.  They do not advocate the remaking of the world under communist rule; 
they operate under the current world system, but with slight variations on the rules.  
China desires the respect and status from other nations, that it believes is inherent with 
being a great power of the world, but they do not recognize what the United States sees as 
the responsibilities of that status.  For example, like the United States, China gives 
military and economic aid to those nations it has friendly relations with; however, unlike 
the United States they usually do not attach conditions on the aid.  The United States uses 
conditions in order to get countries to conform to American ideals concerning human 
rights, democratic reform, or policy concerning drugs or terrorism.  The Chinese likely 
view this as interference in a nation’s internal affairs and being a very private nation 
themselves; they would consider it insulting if they were offered aid with such strings 
attached.   
 The Chinese have had tremendous levels of sustained economic growth until the 
recent global economic recession.  This economic growth has been used to fuel the 
modernization of their military forces.  With the announcement of their plans to construct 
aircraft carriers in the near future, parallels may be drawn to the rise of Germany at the 
start of the twentieth century and their construction of dreadnought battleships.  Chinese 
carriers will give them the ability to defend their claims over undersea resources and 
island chains.  Carriers will also give the Chinese the ability to “show the flag” or project 
their presence to other nations in whole new ways.  Their sending of naval forces off the 
coast of Somalia is a definitive first step towards this goal.  A possibility is that China is 
preparing to compete in a future “scramble for Africa.”  Instead of the creation of 
colonies it will be alliances and trade agreements for access to natural resources and 
energy.  Without aircraft carriers, it would be difficult for China to demonstrate its hard 
power to defend or enforce its agreements.  It’s a widespread belief that China will equal 
or surpass the United States in the future; undoubtedly the Chinese leadership is looking 
to ensure their place in the sun.  
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 There is a great deal of future research possibilities.  The importance of Confucian 
values in government and the Chinese people as a whole may be in question.  Confucian 
values were developed in a time where large families worked together under the firm 
control of a paternal authority figure.  With the one child policy, that child has become 
the focus of the family, or little emperors as they are called.  How this might impact the 
reverence of elders and the respect of the authority has yet to be determined.   
 Using the governmental politics model, or a simplification of it, it may be 
possible to model the bureaucracy of the higher levels of the Chinese government.  If 
adequate background knowledge can be acquired on individuals in positions of authority, 
it may be possible to create a vital information sheet that can be used to determine how 
they will interact.  The governmental politics model refers to these individuals as Players 
and their interactions the Game.  The vital information sheet can be seen as child’s sports 
Trading Card, which uses simplified information to tell which Players form which teams 
and their relative strength.  If applied to past Games or governments, such as the Soviet 
Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, then accurate predictions of current Games such 
as China might be possible.
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